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Mechanized theorem proving is a promising means of formally estab-
lishing facts about complex systems. However, in applying theorem prov-
ing methodologies to industrial-scale hardware and software systems, a large
amount of user interaction is required in order to prove useful properties. In
practice, the human user tasked with such a verification must gain a deep un-
derstanding of the system to be verified, and prove numerous lemmas in order
to allow the theorem proving program to approach a proof of the desired fact.
Furthermore, proofs that fail during this process are a source of confusion: the
proof may either fail because the conjecture was false, or because the prover
required more help from the user in order to reach the desired conclusion.
We have implemented a symbolic execution framework inside the ACL2
theorem prover in order to help address these issues on certain problem do-
v
mains. Our framework introduces a proof strategy that applies bit-level sym-
bolic execution using BDDs to finite-domain problems. This proof strategy
is a fully verified decision procedure for such problems, and on many useful
problem domains its capacity vastly exceeds that of exhaustive testing. Our
framework also produces counterexamples for conjectures that it determines
to be false.
Our framework seeks to reduce the amount of necessary user interaction
in proving theorems about industrial-scale hardware and software systems. By
increasing the automation available in the prover, we allow the user to complete
useful proofs while understanding less of the detailed implementation of the
system. Furthermore, by producing counterexamples for falsified conjectures,
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When using theorem proving to establish correctness properties of in-
dustrial scale hardware and software systems, it is necessary to prove numerous
lemmas on the way to the desired top-level proof. This process requires the
human verifier to obtain a detailed understanding of the program or design
being verified, which is time consuming and expensive. Maintenance of a com-
pleted proof is also expensive: the proof script must be adjusted over time to
accomodate any changes in the implementation of the system under verifica-
tion, and it is usually necessary for the user to understand these changes in
order to make the adjustments. Furthermore, during the process of compos-
ing and maintaining proofs, conventional theorem provers are of limited use
in debugging failed proofs. A failure may occur either because the goal is not
a theorem or because additional lemmas are needed; thus, the user may waste
time proving additional lemmas in an attempt to fix the failed proof before
realizing that the original conjecture was false.
In order to address these problems, we have implemented a framework
that allows symbolic execution of user-defined functions within the ACL2 theo-
rem prover, using a BDD-based symbolic data representation. We have proved
1
sufficient correctness properties about our framework to allow us to use sym-
bolic execution as a proof strategy. For theorems whose variables are restricted
to a finite domain, our framework provides a decision procedure that is fully
verified and has a capacity reaching a large set of problems for which exhaus-
tive simulation is infeasible.
We believe that on domains in which it is applicable, our framework
helps to alleviate some of the drawbacks of interactive theorem proving. By in-
creasing the prover’s capacity to complete proofs automatically, our framework
reduces the level of detail required in the user’s understanding of the artifact
to be verified. Changes in the implementation that are not large enough to
affect the statement of a theorem at this reduced level of detail usually will
not require any changes in the proof script. Finally, when a user attempts to
prove an untrue theorem, our framework provides useful feedback by finding
and displaying counterexamples.
Our symbolic execution framework is called GL, short for “G in the
Logic.” It is a descendent of the G system of Boyer and Hunt [14]. The G
system is also a framework for symbolic execution of ACL2 code. However,
it is implemented in Common Lisp outside of the ACL2 logic, and as a result
its symbolic executions cannot be shown by ACL2 to have any meaning in
the ACL2 logic. Furthermore, during the course of its industrial use, several
logical bugs affecting soundness were found in the G system, and it is not
known whether others remain.
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GL addresses both of these problems of the G system. GL is coded
in the ACL2 logic and its symbolic executions are mechanically proven to
accurately reflect the concrete semantics of ACL2. It also contains a proof
procedure that is integrated with the ACL2 system so that it can be used
directly to prove theorems. GL’s proof procedure is verified in ACL2 by a meta-
level proof. Theorems proven using GL therefore rely only on the soundness
of ACL2 itself and the Hons system [12], which augments ACL2 with function
memoization and unique object representation facilities; no other unverified
add-ons are used in proving these theorems.
In the remainder of this introduction, we first offer a motivating exam-
ple, describing uses of our framework for both semi-formal testing and theorem
proving (Section 1.1). We show in this example how our framework can reduce
the need for difficult, highly interactive, inductive proofs. We then describe
the theoretical basis of the use of symbolic execution for proof (Section 1.2).
In that section we give a mathematical definition of symbolic execution and
prove a metatheorem that encapsulates our strategy for proof by symbolic
execution.
In the rest of this dissertation, we first describe the implementation
of symbolic execution in our framework (Chapter 2). Next, we build on the
theory described in Section 1.2 to describe how we automate proofs using the
symbolic execution core (Chapter 3); we discuss several features of our frame-
work designed to facilitate such proofs. We then describe a hardware model-
ing framework which we have integrated with GL in order to allow symbolic
3
execution-based proofs about hardware models (Chapter 4), and illustrate the
use of this hardware modeling technology in conjunction with GL in a case
study describing a successful industrial application at Centaur Technology
(Chapter 5). We review related work, then conclude by discussing possible
future improvements to and potential new uses for our framework.
1.1 Motivating Example
We now work through a motivating example showing how GL can be
used to prove a theorem that is quite difficult for a human user to prove using
traditional theorem proving methods, and which takes significantly longer to
prove using exhaustive simulation. In the example, we will study an integer
square root algorithm. We will first demonstrate how GL may be used to run
symbolic tests of the algorithm, illustrating the use of symbolic execution in
our framework (Subsection 1.1.1). We then describe the process of proving
the correctness of this algorithm using GL (Subsection 1.1.2).
Our example is a fixed-width integer square root algorithm. Its inputs
are natural numbers n and w, where n should have bit width less than or
equal to w, and the specification of the algorithm is simply that it should
produce the greatest integer whose square is less than or equal to n. This
algorithm, described by Crenshaw [27], is of a style that might be implemented
in hardware: it avoids multiplications and divisions and its main loop contains
only shifting, bit-masking, addition, and comparison operations. Pseudocode
for the algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1; this listing uses the symbols <
4
Algorithm 1 Integer square root
1: procedure Int-Sqrt(n,w)
2: k ← dw/2e
3: rem ← 0
4: root ← 0
5: for i from 1 to k do
6: root ← root << 1
7: rem ← (rem << 2) + (n >> (2k − 2))
8: n← (n << 2) & ((1 << 2k)− 1)
9: root ← root + 1
10: if root ≤ rem then
11: rem ← rem − root
12: root ← root + 1
13: else
14: root ← root − 1
15: return root >> 1
<, >>, and & for left-shift, right-shift, and bitwise-and, respectively. The
corresponding ACL2 function definitions are given as Program 1. Although
this algorithm is small, it is not straightforward to prove correct by traditional
theorem proving methods. Even with a good understanding of the algorithm,
it is challenging to discover the invariant necessary for a proof by induction.
In most cases, during the course of proving a theorem like this one, the verifier
will attempt to prove several incorrect invariants before finding the correct one.
For each failed proof of an invariant, the verifier must examine the output of
the failed proof in an attempt to diagnose the problem. A proof might fail
because of a flaw in the proposed invariant, but also might fail because the
prover’s current set of arithmetic reasoning rules was not powerful enough to
prove the invariant. Worse, sometimes there is a flaw in the invariant that
5
Program 1 Int-Sqrt ACL2 definitions
(defun int-sqrt (n w)
(let ((k (ceiling w 2)))
(int-sqrt-loop k n 0 0 (* 2 k))))
(defun int-sqrt-loop (ctr n rem root width)
(if (zp ctr)
(>> root 1)
(let* ((root (<< root 1))
(rem (+ (<< rem 2) (>> n (- width 2))))
(n (& (<< n 2) (- (<< 1 width) 1)))
(root (+ 1 root)))
(mv-let (root rem)
(if (<= root rem)
(mv (+ 1 root) (- rem root))
(mv (- root 1) rem))
(int-sqrt-loop (- ctr 1) n rem root width)))))
the prover’s arithmetic reasoning is not yet strong enough to reveal. Thus
a correctness proof for an algorithm such as this may consume many hours
of effort even for an experienced user of a theorem prover with an advanced
arithmetic library.
The GL framework may be used to verify this algorithm for a fixed
bit-width that is sufficiently small. Empirically, the time and memory used by
symbolic execution for this proof increases by a factor of about 1.5 for every
additional bit. Since this growth is exponential, the scaling is limited. Never-
theless, symbolic execution is significantly faster than exhaustive simulation:
at 32 bits, symbolic execution takes about 90 seconds, whereas exhaustive sim-
ulation takes about 70 minutes on the same machine. Many other examples
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exhibit better scaling than this one; in Chapter 5, for example, we describe
floating-point addition verifications in which these symbolic execution tech-
niques scale up to addition of two 80-bit floating-point inputs. We chose the
Int-Sqrt example for this initial exposition because the statement of the al-
gorithm and its correctness condition are very concise despite the difficulty of
the inductive proof.
1.1.1 Testing with Symbolic Execution
GL’s symbolic execution capabilities may be used to test the algorithm
symbolically, effectively running many tests in a single symbolic execution. To
perform such tests, we must provide input in the form of a symbolic object, an
abstraction of program data that may represent many possible concrete values.
A symbolic execution on such an object effectively tests the algorithm on each
of the values represented by the input. The output of the symbolic execution
will also be a symbolic object; this result object will represent the possible
results of the algorithm on the values represented by the symbolic input. This
result object may be examined to determine whether any unexpected values
occur.
For example, one might test that for some fixed natural number k,
Int-Sqrt(n,w) = k for all n from k2 to k2 + 2k, given some w chosen so
that n < 2w. Let us take k = 50 and w = 32. To perform this test, we
may symbolically execute Int-Sqrt(n, 32) with n assigned a symbolic object
whose possible values include all integers in the range from 502 = 2500 to
7
502 + 2 · 50 = 2600. The result of this computation will be a symbolic object
whose possible values include all of the results of Int-Sqrt(n, 32) for n in this
range.
GL’s symbolic object format primarily uses a bit-level data represen-
tation, with BDDs [20] representing Boolean functions. GL symbolic objects
consist of BDDs wrapped in tagged structures that describe how the individ-
ual bits represented by the BDDs are to be combined into data objects. These
tagged structures support symbolic objects ranging over all types of data in
the universe of ACL2 objects, with special support for Booleans, numbers, and
conses. We describe the symbolic object format in Section 2.1. For this exam-
ple we will use a symbolic object construct that ranges over a set of integers.
This will allow us to construct an object representing n of the range described
above.
The following object is a symbolic integer in the GL symbolic object
format, where each of the bi are BDDs:
(:NUM (b0 b1 . . . bm))
This symbolic object’s possible values consist of some set of integers, depending
on the characteristics of the BDDs b0, . . . , bm. This object may be evaluated,
yielding an integer value, by assigning a Boolean value to each variable in these
BDDs. This assignment allows each BDD to evaluate to a Boolean value, and
the value of the symbolic object is then the two’s-complement integer composed
of those bits, with the least significant bits on the left. For example, if b0 takes
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the value true and all the other BDDs take the value false, then this object’s
value is 1; if bm is true and all others are false, then this object’s value is −2m,
negative because of the two’s-complement encoding.
To represent the desired range 2500 ≤ n ≤ 2600 in this format, we need
to construct a symbolic object whose evaluations yield the two’s-complement
bits of integers in that range and no other values. To do this, we must construct
a list of BDDs b0, . . . , bm that always evaluate to a list of Boolean values rep-
resenting a two’s-complement number in that range, and which may evaluate
to any number in that range. Constructing such a list of BDDs whose values
cover exactly some particular set of values is, in general, quite difficult to do
manually, since there may be many interdependencies between the individual
bits. GL instead offers an automated process that uses BDD parametriza-
tion [5] to reduce a symbolic object that covers a larger set of values than
desired to one that covers exactly the desired set. (We describe this process
in Section 3.1.) Usually it is easy to construct a symbolic object that covers a
superset of the desired values; parametrization will reduce this object to one
that covers only the values needed.
The user interface for our automated parametrization process requires
the user to provide a shape specifier instead of creating a symbolic object
directly. A shape specifier is formatted similarly to a symbolic object, but
replaces the BDDs contained within the object with indices indicating BDD
variables. It therefore gives type and size information about the object as well
as a BDD ordering of its bits, but does not allow complex interdependencies
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between the BDDs. We discuss the reasons for preferring shape specifiers
over symbolic objects in Section 3.2. One appropriate shape specifier for our
example is the following object:
(:NUM (12 11 . . . 1 0)).
This shape specifier describes an integer of 13 two’s-complement bits, thus
ranging from −4096 to 4095; thus, it covers our desired range and is very
simple to construct.
We perform BDD parametrization and symbolic execution using the
Gl-Interp program, which takes three inputs: the term to be symbolically
executed, an association list of bindings giving the shape specifier for each of
the free variables of the term, and optionally a hypothesis with which to restrict
the inputs by BDD parametrization. For our test, we would call Gl-Interp
as follows:
(gl-interp (int-sqrt n 32)
’((n (:NUM (12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0))))
:hyp (and (<= 2500 n) (<= n 2600)))
The symbolic result yielded by this computation is simply 50, meaning that
this is the only possible result of Int-Sqrt(n, 32) for all n in the specified
range. However, if we run this form with the range extended up to 2700, then
the result is a :NUM object, reflecting the fact that there is more than one
possible value of the function for inputs in this range. In fact, the particular
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object returned has a non-constant BDD in its low-order bit, but every other
bit is a constant T or NIL; this reflects the fact that the only two possible
values are 50 and 51, which differ only in the least significant bit.
To perform this symbolic execution of the Int-Sqrt function, Gl-
Interp uses a symbolic interpreter. A symbolic interpreter takes a term ob-
ject (in this case, (int-sqrt n 32)) as input along with a table associating
each free variable of the term with a symbolic object, and it produces a sym-
bolic result representing the value of that term. It functions by performing
a McCarthy-style recursive interpretation of the term, in which it may de-
scend into the bodies of defined functions as well as subterms. The symbolic
interpretation algorithm is described in detail in Section 2.5. The symbolic
interpreter must also be able to symbolically execute functions with no defini-
tions, such as the ACL2 primitives + and <. For each one of these primitives,
we define a symbolic counterpart, a function designed specifically to perform a
symbolic execution of that primitive. We describe the definition of symbolic
counterparts for primitives in Section 2.3 and automatic generation of symbolic
counterparts for other functions in Section 2.4. The symbolic interpreter also
handles If terms specially so as to avoid symbolic execution of unreachable
control branches; this is described in Section 2.2.
1.1.2 Proof by Symbolic Execution
We now sketch the process of proving the correctness of this algorithm
on 32-bit inputs using GL. First, we state the theorem we are interested in
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proving:
Theorem (Correctness of Int-Sqrt for 32-bit inputs). If n is an integer and
0 ≤ n < 232, let root = Inv-Sqrt(n, 32). Then:
root2 ≤ n < (root + 1)2.
To prove this theorem using GL, we separate its statement into hy-
potheses, which restrict the domain of the free (implicitly universally quanti-
fied) variables of the theorem, and conclusion. Here, our hypothesis is that n
is a 32-bit natural number, and the conclusion is that Inv-Sqrt operates as
specified on n. Then, we symbolically execute the conclusion using symbolic
input data that represents all inputs that satisfy the hypotheses. The con-
clusion takes the form of a conjunction of inequalities, which always results
in a Boolean value. This symbolic execution will therefore result in a sym-
bolic Boolean value. This value represents all of the possible evaluations of
the conclusion on the inputs in our domain of interest. If the symbolic result
value is constant-true, then we may infer that the conclusion is always true on
these inputs, i.e., the theorem holds. We expand on this argument, describing
sufficient conditions for proof by symbolic execution, in Section 1.2
This theorem involves one free variable n, which is constrained by the
hypotheses to be a 32-bit natural number. Therefore, we must assign to n a
shape specifier that represents a superset of the 32-bit naturals. The following
shape specifier represents a 33-bit signed integer, which is sufficient to cover
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the 32-bit naturals:
(:NUM (32 31 . . . 1 0)).
We have chosen in this case to associate the lowest-numbered variable indices
with the most significant bits of this symbolic integer, because empirically this
leads to better symbolic execution performance on this algorithm than the
reverse order. It is often the case that a good choice of ordering for the BDD
variables is crucial for symbolic execution performance.
We may use this binding to perform a simulation using Gl-Interp as
we did for the test case above, symbolically executing the conclusion with the
hypothesis that 0 ≤ n < 232:
(gl-interp (let* ((root (int-sqrt n 32))
(sq (* root root)))
(and (<= sq n)
(< n (+ sq (* 2 root) 1))))
’((n (:NUM (32 31 ... 3 2 1 0))))
:hyp (and (<= 0 n) (<= n (expt 2 32))))
From this symbolic execution we get the result T, indicating that this is the
only possible value of the conclusion under the assumption of the hypothesis.
This provides evidence that our conjecture is a theorem, but does not cause
the formula to be accepted as a theorem in ACL2.
For admitting such claims as ACL2 theorems, GL provides a utility
called Def-GL-Thm (“define a theorem using GL.”) The command used to
13
Program 2 ACL2 event for Int-Sqrt correctness theorem
(def-gl-thm 32-bit-int-sqrt-correct
:hyp (and (integerp n)
(<= 0 n)
(< n (expt 2 32)))
:concl (let* ((root (int-sqrt n 32))
(sq (* root root)))
(and (<= sq n)
(< n (+ sq (* 2 root) 1))))
:g-bindings ‘((n ,(g-number
’((32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0))))))
prove our Int-Sqrt correctness theorem is listed as Program 2. This form
macroexpands to a Defthm command, shown in Program 3, which instructs
ACL2 to attempt to prove the conjecture and, if successful, enter it in its
database of facts. This Defthm command also provides a hint to the prover
instructing it to using the GL clause processor, a proof procedure that applies
symbolic execution in order to show that the conclusion holds when the hy-
potheses are fulfilled. We discuss the GL clause processor in detail in Section
3.3.
When the Def-GL-Thm form is run, ACL2 processes the resulting
Defthm event. Because of the hint given, ACL2 immediately calls the GL
clause processor on the conjecture. The clause processor proceeds in steps
similar to the ones used above to test the algorithm. First it transforms the
user-provided shape specifier into a symbolic input object that covers only the
values satisfying the hypothesis. Next it symbolically executes the conclusion
14
Program 3 Macroexpansion of Int-Sqrt correctness theorem
(defthm 32-bit-int-sqrt-correct
(implies (and (integerp n)
(<= 0 n)
(< n (expt 2 32)))
(let* ((root (int-sqrt n 32))
(sq (* root root)))
(and (<= sq n)








(32 31 30 29 28
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15




with this symbolic object as its input. Finally, it analyzes the symbolic re-
sult produced by the symbolic execution of the conclusion. If this result is
constant-true, then the symbolic execution was successful. If not, then the
clause processor uses this result to construct a counterexample to the claim
and displays this counterexample to the user.
When the symbolic execution completes successfully, the clause proces-
sor produces one further proof obligation that must be discharged in order to
admit the theorem. We must show that the shape specifiers that we provided
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for the free variables of the theorem are sufficiently general to cover all as-
signments of these variables that satisfy the hypotheses. If the shape specifier
that we provided for n only represented 10-bit integers, for example, then a
successful symbolic execution would not imply anything about inputs greater
than 29−1 = 511. Our successful symbolic execution only implies the correct-
ness of our theorem if every input satisfying the hypothesis is covered by the
shape specifier provided. Def-GL-Thm gives hints to the prover that aid in
completing this coverage proof; in this case, these hints are sufficient to com-
plete the proof without user intervention. We discuss the logical necessity for
this coverage obligation in Section 1.2 and our proof strategy for this coverage
obligation in Section 3.2.
This proof completes in under 90 seconds on an Intel Xeon R© E5450
CPU. While the correctness proof of this algorithm does not scale much beyond
32 bits, we have provided this example to show that GL is capable of quickly
performing proofs that would be quite time consuming to carry out using
conventional theorem proving methods such as rewriting and induction. In
Chapter 5 we will discuss an industrial application in which GL is used for
several proofs that would have been extremely difficult and time consuming
to accomplish using conventional theorem proving, and also far beyond the
capacity of exhaustive testing.
16
1.2 Theory
The GL symbolic execution framework adds to the ACL2 logic a rea-
soning tool for proving conjectures whose variables range over finite sets of
objects. From a logical standpoint, our new reasoning procedure is, in most
cases, equivalent to proof by exhaustive simulation: when the hypotheses of a
theorem restrict the free variables so that they each range over a finite set, in
principle the theorem can be proven simply by evaluating the conclusion for
every possible setting of the variables. However, our tool can succeed in many
cases where the finite set of inputs is far too large for exhaustive simulation
to be practical.
The reasoning engine used in this proof procedure is symbolic execu-
tion. Intuitively, to perform a symbolic execution of a program is to perform
analogous operations on symbolic data objects to the operations the program
itself would perform on concrete data during an ordinary execution. These
symbolic data objects may represent many possible concrete data objects, and
therefore the result of a symbolic execution may reveal properties common to
many concrete executions. Symbolic execution may be used as a reasoning
tool by inferring properties of the program under study from properties of the
result of the symbolic execution.
Much of the practical usefulness of symbolic execution as a reasoning
tool depends on the particular representation of symbolic objects. However,
since in this section we are concerned with the theory of symbolic execution
rather than its practicality, we do not yet specify a format for symbolic ob-
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jects. In this section, we only require that symbolic objects are data objects
which may be evaluated, yielding concrete values. They are thus a data rep-
resentation of functions on some domain. A symbolic execution of a program
on some symbolic objects yields a new symbolic object which represents the
function composition of this program with the functions represented by the
symbolic inputs.
For example, consider this symbolic object from the previous section:
(:NUM (b0 b1 . . . bn))
This object may be evaluated by assigning Boolean values to the variables
referenced in the BDDs b0, . . . , bn. Under this assignment, each BDD takes
a Boolean value and these values are then interpreted as the binary digits of
a two’s-complement integer. Therefore, this object represents some function
whose domain is the set of possible assignments of Boolean values to BDD
variables, and whose range is some subset of the integer values between −2n
and 2n−1. The symbolic execution of the Int-Sqrt operation on this symbolic
input object yields a new symbolic object which represents the composition of
the Int-Sqrt function with the function represented by the input object.
We sometimes describe a symbolic object by its coverage set, the range
of the function it represents. We say a symbolic object covers a set if that set
is a subset of its coverage set. Note that in the example above, the coverage set
depends on the particular BDDs bi. If each of these BDDs is an independent
variable, then the coverage set is the entire integer range from −2n to 2n − 1.
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On the other hand, if each is a constant, then the coverage set contains only
a single value.
A symbolic object’s coverage set is not a complete description of that
object. For example, consider the symbolic objects (:NUM (v)) and (:NUM
(¬v)). Both of these objects cover the set {0,−1}. If we considered only the
coverage sets of these objects and imagined including them into an ordered
pair, we might expect the coverage of that pair to be
{(0, 0), (0,−1), (−1, 0), (−1,−1)},
the Cartesian product of their coverage sets. However, because they share a
variable in their representations, their pairing would in fact only cover the set
{(0,−1), (−1, 0)}. Because of variable interdependencies in the representations
of symbolic objects, it is important to think of symbolic objects as representing
functions ranging over concrete objects, rather than simply sets of concrete
objects.
The set of concrete executions represented by a symbolic execution is
determined by the coverage set of the symbolic input vector, and the set of
possible values produced by those concrete executions is represented by the
coverage set of the symbolic result. This observation can be used to prove con-
jectures by symbolic execution. Suppose the conjecture has hypotheses which
constrain the values of the free variables to some finite set. One might choose
an assignment of symbolic inputs to the variables such that the coverage set of
these inputs in aggregate covers the set of values allowed by the hypotheses.
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A symbolic execution of the conclusion on these same inputs then yields a
symbolic object covering the set of possible values of the conclusion on the
allowed inputs. In particular, if the symbolic result may only take the value
true, then the theorem is proven. Otherwise, often the result may be examined
to produce specific counterexamples. Our symbolic execution tool automates
this proof procedure and counterexample generation for failed proofs.
We now more rigorously describe the logical meaning of symbolic ex-
ecution, and show that it can be used to prove theorems as described above
and as illustrated by example in the previous section. We will first define
some terms and then describe a method for performing a proof by symbolic
execution. We also prove a metatheorem stating the soundness of this method
of proof.
If s is a symbolic object, we write 〈s〉 for the function represented
by that object.1 We call the inputs to such functions environments ; for any
environment e, 〈s〉(e) is the concrete value of s under environment e. The
coverage set of s is the range of 〈s〉.
In the examples of symbolic objects and evaluations we have described
so far, the environments have been sequences of Booleans providing values for
each of the BDD variables, and the coverage sets have been subsets of the in-
1We use similar notation to denote the Boolean function represented by a BDD b, namely
〈b〉bdd . Because ACL2 is a first-order logic, there can be no operator 〈〉 that takes a data
object as input and produces a function as its result. Instead, we use an evaluator function
for symbolic objects that produces the value 〈s〉(e) given s and e as inputs, and an evaluator
for BDDs that produces the value 〈b〉bdd(e) given inputs b and e.
20
tegers. However, for the purposes of this theoretical exposition, the particular
format of symbolic objects and the type and characteristics of environments
are unimportant.
A symbolic execution of a function f on symbolic input s is a computa-
tion that results in a symbolic object representing the functional composition
of f with 〈s〉; that is, a symbolic object s′ satisfying
∀e . 〈s′〉(e) = f (〈s〉 (e)) , (1.1)
or equivalently
〈s′〉 = f ◦ 〈s〉.
We call a function fsym a symbolic counterpart for f if it always performs a
symbolic execution of f on its argument; that is,
∀s, e . 〈fsym (s)〉(e) = f (〈s〉 (e)) , (1.2)
or
∀s . 〈fsym (s)〉 = f ◦ 〈s〉.
These definitions generalize straightforwardly to higher-arity functions; we use
a single variable only for simplicity of presentation.
Suppose we wish to prove a theorem ∀x . Hyp(x) ⇒ Concl(x). The
following metatheorem describes a set of conditions under which this conjec-
ture is provable by symbolic execution.
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Theorem 1.2.1 (Proof by symbolic execution). Suppose:
• Some symbolic object s covers the set of inputs satisfying Hyp:
∀x . Hyp(x)⇒ ∃e . x = 〈s〉(e) (1.3)
• Conclsym is a symbolic counterpart for Concl:
∀s, e . 〈Conclsym (s)〉(e) = Concl (〈s〉(e)) (1.4)
• Conclsym(s) yields a constant-true symbolic value:
∀e . 〈Conclsym (s)〉(e) = true. (1.5)
Then
∀x . Hyp(x)⇒ Concl(x).
Proof of this theorem is by simple substitutions: given x satisfying Hyp(x),
by Equation 1.3 we have some e satisfying x = 〈s〉(e). Then
Concl(x) = Concl (〈s〉 (e))
= 〈Conclsym(s)〉(e) (by Equation 1.4)
= true (by Equation 1.5).
Our framework aids the user in satisfying these three conditions and
provides automation for performing proofs in this style. We describe the im-
plementation of symbolic execution and symbolic objects in Chapter 2. This
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will clarify the process by which symbolic counterparts are defined and proven
correct in order to satisfy Equation 1.4. Additionally, we will describe our sym-
bolic object format and show how such objects may be syntactically analyzed
for truth and falsehood, so that Equation 1.5 may be proven. We describe
the user-level framework in Chapter 3, including the tools we provide for de-
scribing suitable symbolic input objects and proving coverage as required by
Equation 1.3.
1.3 Notational Conventions
We use a pseudocode/mathematical notation to describe our algorithms
rather than Lisp notation. Function names (Int-Sqrt) are printed using small
capitals, and non-function symbols (T, NIL) are printed in a typewriter font.
As introduced in the theory section, we use angle brackets as in 〈x〉(y)
to denote that we have interpreted the data object x as a function and applied
it to argument y. Commonly, x is a symbolic object, y an environment, and
〈x〉(y) is the evaluation of x under y. However, we use similar notation 〈b〉bdd(v)
to denote evaluation of BDD b under an assignment v of Boolean values to
BDD variables.
We use the propositional logic connectives ∨, ∧, ¬, ⊕, ⇒, and ⇔ in
the conventional manner. However, we also use these symbols to denote BDD
operations, in which case we superscript them with an asterisk, as in ∨∗, ¬∗,
and ⇒∗.
23
The symbols T and NIL are associated with true and false in ACL2;
however, as in Common Lisp, any non-NIL object is considered true for the
purpose of testing in if-then-else contexts. In keeping with this convention,
when we say an object is true, we mean that it is non-NIL; when we speak of





In Section 1.2, we described a method for proving theorems using sym-
bolic execution. This method requires some symbolic object format and some
mechanism for performing symbolic executions. We describe the syntax and
semantics of GL’s symbolic objects in Section 2.1, and we present our mecha-
nisms for performing symbolic executions in the remainder of this chapter.
One major challenge of performing symbolic executions of arbitrary
user code is in handling control branches. When symbolically executing an
if/then/else term, in general one may need to compute a symbolic value for
the test and both the then and else branches, and finally merge these three
values together into a result which represents the if/then/else term as a whole.
However, in some cases the test may result in a constant-true or constant-
false value; it is often important for performance to recognize these cases
and evaluate only the reachable control branch. We describe our method for
handling control branches within symbolic executions in Section 2.2.
In Section 2.3, we describe our method of symbolically executing prim-
itive functions, i.e. functions that are not defined in terms of others but
axiomatized to have certain behavior. We handle these by manually defining
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symbolic counterparts for each of the ACL2 primitives, and additionally for
some other functions for which a manually-defined symbolic counterpart gives
a performance benefit. We describe in that section how we have defined these
symbolic counterparts and proven them correct.
Given methods for symbolically executing control branches and prim-
itive functions, a symbolic execution of any term may be accomplished. We
describe two methods of performing such a symbolic execution; in both of these
methods, the symbolic executions provably reflect ACL2 semantics and may
therefore be used in proofs. In Section 2.4 we describe the first such method,
which uses a code transformation that operates on some user-provided function
f , producing a new function fsym that is proven to be a symbolic counterpart
for f . In Section 2.5 we describe the second method, in which a symbolic inter-
preter operates directly on user-provided terms, provably computing symbolic
executions of these terms.
Using the techniques in this chapter, we can symbolically execute any
recursively-defined function in the ACL2 logic. Furthermore, this symbolic
execution is known to produce a correct result, i.e. a symbolic object repre-
senting the composition of the function with the symbolic inputs. This allows
us to prove theorems using the method described in Section 1.2.
2.1 Symbolic Objects
The GL symbolic object format is optimized to represent object types
that we expect to be commonly used in hardware verification, namely integers,
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Booleans, and list structures. However, it is also capable of representing any
finite function from Boolean variables into the universe of ACL2 data objects.
This universe of objects consists of conses (ordered pairs) and atoms, which
include symbols, complex rational numbers, characters, and strings. However,
the universe is not assumed to be closed: it is not provable that every ACL2
object is of one of these types.
Well-formed symbolic objects are themselves ACL2 objects. Their al-
lowed syntax is given by a predicate GlObjectp (“GL object predicate”) and
their semantics is defined by a series of evaluator functions. In this section
we will describe their syntax and semantics, the necessity of having multiple
evaluator functions, and some tools we have developed in order to ease the
process of operating on symbolic objects and reasoning about such operations.
2.1.1 Symbolic Object Format
The GL symbolic object format provides structures that may contain
both Boolean function objects and unconstrained variable objects. Boolean
functions are represented in this format as a form of binary decision diagrams
called uBDDs [12]. Evaluation of a symbolic object requires an assignment
giving a Boolean value for each uBDD variable and a concrete value for each
unconstrained variable. We call this assignment the evaluation environment.
Each uBDD within the symbolic object structure is evaluated under the envi-
ronment, yielding a Boolean value, and each unconstrained variable within the
object is simply replaced by its assigned value. The structuring of the sym-
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bolic object then determines how these values are combined to form an ACL2
object: bits produced by uBDDs may translate directly to Boolean values or
become embedded within a numeric representation, and all symbolic objects
may be combined into cons trees or if-then-else constructs.
The primary form of symbolic reasoning used in our system is manipula-
tion of uBDDs. We therefore introduce the syntax of uBDDs before describing
that of symbolic objects. The constant-true and constant-false functions are
represented by the symbols T and NIL, respectively, and cons trees with T and
NIL leaves denote non-constant functions. Similar to other BDD representa-
tions, the variables on which these functions depend are indexed [20] rather
than given symbolic names. The function represented by a uBDD may be
evaluated using an ordered list of Boolean values, where the nth value in the
list is the assignment for the nth variable. We use the notation 〈x〉bdd(~b) for
evaluation of a uBDD x by a list of Boolean values ~b, and vi to denote the ith
BDD variable, so that 〈vi〉bdd(~b) gives the ith element of the Boolean list ~b.
The semantics of symbolic objects, described below, are given by eval-
uator functions that take a symbolic object s and an environment e. As intro-
duced previously, we use the notation 〈s〉(e) to denote evaluation of s under
environment e. An environment e contains a list of Booleans, BddVals(e),
giving the assignment of values to uBDD variables, and an association list,
VarVals(e), giving values (of arbitrary type) to named unconstrained vari-
ables. An evaluator function evaluates the uBDDs throughout s to Boolean
values, and replaces each unconstrained variable in s with its assigned value.
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The format of s then dictates how these values are combined to form a concrete
result.
GL allows multiple different evaluator functions to be defined because
of the App symbolic object construct, which, as described below, represents a
function applied to symbolic arguments. Because ACL2 does not allow func-
tions as first-class objects, every evaluator has a fixed set of function names
that it recognizes and can apply. If the named function is not in this set, the
evaluation of a symbolic object applying that function is undefined. However,
new evaluators may be defined that recognize additional function symbols.
Most theorems proved about a previous evaluator, including symbolic coun-
terpart correctness conjectures, may be used to prove similar theorems about
such an extended evaluator by functional instantiation [11]. Our framework
does not allow malformed evaluators, such as ones which apply the wrong
function for a given symbol, to be used in proofs; the result produced by any
evaluator on a given symbolic object and environment is the same as that
produced by any other evaluator when it is defined.
We now list the types of symbolic object constructs, their syntax and
their evaluation semantics. The function BitsToNumber, used in evaluating
the Num construct, is described below.
Atom. Syntax: Any non-cons object obj other than the symbols :CONCR,
:BOOL, :NUM, :ITE, :VAR, or :APP. Evaluation: obj itself.
29
Cons. Syntax: (x . y) where x and y are well-formed symbolic objects.
Evaluation: (〈x 〉(e) . 〈y〉(e)).
Concr. Syntax: (:CONCR . obj) for any object obj . Evaluation: obj itself.
Bool. Syntax: (:BOOL . b) where b is a well-formed uBDD. Evaluation:
〈b〉bdd(BddVals(e)).
Num. Syntax: (:NUM . bits), where bits is a list of four or fewer lists of
uBDDs. Evaluation: BitsToNumber(bits , e).
Ite. Syntax: (:ITE test then . else) where test , then, and else are well-
formed symbolic objects. Evaluation: If 〈test〉(e), then 〈then〉(e), else
〈else〉(e).
Var. Syntax: (:VAR . v) for any v . Evaluation: Lookup(v ,VarVals(e)).
App. Syntax: (:APP f . args) where f is a symbol and args is a well-formed
symbolic object. Evaluation: f(〈args〉(e)), if the evaluator recognizes f ,
otherwise undefined. Here 〈args〉(e) is expected to be a list of length
equal to the arity of f .
The BitsToNumber function evaluates the four or fewer lists of
uBDDs from a Num form and uses the resulting bits to construct a com-
plex rational number. The four possible lists represent the numerator and
denominator of the real part, then the numerator and denominator of the
imaginary part. Numerators are interpreted as two’s-complement and default
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Symbolic Object Coverage Set
(:BOOL . v0) {T, NIL}
12 {12}
(:NUM (v0 NIL)) {0, 1}
(:NUM (v0 v1)) {−2,−1, 0, 1}
(:NUM (v0 T v0)) {−1, 2}
(:ITE (:BOOL . v0) A . (:NUM (v1))) {A,−1, 0}
(:CONCR . (:NUM (v0))) {(:NUM (v0))}
((:CONCR . :CONCR) . X) {(:CONCR . X)}
(:VAR . Z) U
(:APP BOOLEANP (:VAR . Z)) {T, NIL}
Table 2.1: Symbolic Object Examples
to 0 when not present; denominators are interpreted as unsigned and default
to 1 when not present.
We list some examples of symbolic objects with their coverage sets in
Table 2.1. In the final example, U signifies the entire universe of ACL2 objects.
In the symbolic object format, the keyword symbols :CONCR, :BOOL,
:NUM, :ITE, :VAR, and :APP act as syntax markers. Due to the Atom and
Cons forms, any object that does not contain one of the syntax marker key-
words is a well-formed symbolic object that evaluates to itself. The Concr
form provides a way to represent objects which do contain these symbols. This
together with the Bool and Ite constructs allow this format to represent any
function from finitely many Boolean variables to ACL2 objects. The Num
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form is redundant in the sense that it does not allow any additional functions
to be represented, but it provides a more compact representation for numbers,
which is desirable for efficiency of symbolic execution. The Var form may rep-
resent any object at all and is useful for symbolic executions in which certain
inputs are irrelevant. Finally, the App form represents a function applied to
symbolic arguments, as described above.
In order to prove facts about our core symbolic object system, we define
a generic evaluator GEval which does not recognize any function symbols in
the App form. Because every other symbolic object evaluator is an extension
of GEval, theorems about this function may be functionally instantiated to
prove similar theorems about other evaluators; it is therefore convenient to
prove all necessary lemmas about GEval initially, from which the analogous
lemmas about other evaluators may be derived. Despite the possible existence
of many evaluators, we will continue to use the notation 〈s〉(e); the specific
symbolic object evaluator in use is rarely important, since most any fact proven
about one evaluator can be proven about another that recognizes a superset
of the original evaluator’s function symbols.
2.1.2 Constructors, Accessors, and Recognizers
In order to reason about symbolic objects, such as when proving the
correctness of symbolic counterpart functions, it is convenient to ignore the
concrete syntax of the symbolic objects and instead reason at a more abstract
level, using rules regarding constructor, accessor, and recognizer functions. In
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this subsection we describe concepts we use in order to reason about symbolic
objects at a higher level of abstraction.
We use the Defaggregate library of Davis [30] to define constructor,
recognizer, and accessor functions for each tagged type of symbolic object. For
the Bool form, for example, this defines a constructor Bool which takes an
input b and creates a tagged object (:BOOL . b), an accessor BoolBdd that
extracts b from such an object, and a predicate BoolP that recognizes Bool
objects. The Defaggregate forms introducing the six tagged types produce the
following functions:
Constructors: Bool, Num, Concr, Ite, App, Var;
Recognizers: BoolP, NumP, ConcrP, IteP, AppP, VarP;
Accessors: BoolBdd, NumBits, ConcrObj, IteTest, IteThen,
IteElse, AppFn, AppArgs, VarName.
The Defaggregate tool also automatically introduces various rewrite
rules for reasoning about the functions it introduces. For example, the fol-
lowing rule is proven about the constructor function Ite and the accessor
IteTest:
IteTest(Ite(test , then, else)) = test .
We also separately prove theorems regarding the evaluation of these
forms by GEval. For example, the evaluation theorem for the Ite constructor
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is as follows:
〈Ite(test , then, else)〉(env) = if 〈test〉(env)
then 〈then〉(env)
else 〈else〉(env).
These constructors, accessors, and recognizers are strictly syntax ori-
ented functions; it is often more convenient to use functions whose behavior
is less rigid with regard to syntax. For example, when constructing a new
symbolic object, most often we want to create an object with certain seman-
tics, rather than a particular syntax; we would prefer the resulting syntactic
representation to be as simple as possible. For example, we would prefer to
create the atom 1 rather than the number (:NUM (T NIL)). We implement
simplifying constructors to achieve this. It is also often the case that we want
to know what type of concrete object a given symbolic object may represent,
rather than its syntactic type. We therefore define extended recognizers for
certain types of symbolic objects. Finally, we define generalized accessors so
that when the syntactic type of an object is not known, we may still perform
operations semantically analogous to extracting fields of these objects.
We define four simplifying constructors:
• MkBool(bdd): if bdd is a constant T or NIL, then bdd , otherwise
Bool(bdd);
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• MkNum(bits): if bits is a list of lists of Booleans (that is, constant-
valued BDDs), then the concrete number described by those bits; other-
wise Num(bits);
• MkIte(test , then, else): then or else as appropriate if either the truth
value of test may be determined syntactically, or if then and else are
syntactically equal; Ite(test , then, else) otherwise;
• MkConcr(obj ): Concr(obj ) if obj contains a syntax marker keyword,
otherwise obj itself.
Each simplifying constructor is proven to be equivalent under evaluation to
the corresponding simple syntactic constructor. For example,
〈MkBool(b)〉(env) = 〈b〉bdd(env)
= 〈Bool(b)〉(env).
We define generalized recognizers for the following four categories of
symbolic objects:
• General Booleans : Bool and Boolean-valued Atom and Concr objects,
recognized by GenBoolP;
• General Numbers : Num and numeric-valued Atom and Concr objects,
recognized by GenNumP;
• General Conses : Cons and cons-valued Concr objects, recognized by
GenConsP;
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• General Concretes : Atom objects, Concr objects, and cons trees of
Atom and Concr objects, recognized by GenConcrP.
The last category is somewhat unlike the first three. The first three categories
each contain symbolic objects that must evaluate to a particular type. On the
other hand, the distinguishing feature of general concrete objects is that they
may only evaluate to one possible value, which may be determined syntacti-
cally. This category also overlaps with the other three categories, which are
themselves disjoint.
These extended recognizers are not intended to recognize all symbolic
objects that always evaluate to the appropriate type, but rather a useful subset
of symbolic objects based on their evaluation semantics. For example, an Ite
object will always evaluate to a Boolean if both of its branches always evaluate
to Booleans, but such an Ite object is not considered a general Boolean.
We define the following extended accessors that act like the correspond-
ing simple syntactic accessors but may operate on symbolic objects within the
general category, rather than a single syntactic type:
• GenBoolBdd returns the BDD reflecting the value of a generalized
Boolean: the bdd field of a Bool object, or the (constant) value of a
Boolean atom, which is a syntactically valid BDD itself.
• GenNumBits returns four values, each a list of BDDs reflecting, re-
spectively, the bits of the numerator and denominator of the real and
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imaginary parts of a generalized number. When the argument is a Num
object, this function simply extracts the bits field; otherwise the argu-
ment must be a numeric atom, which is exploded into lists of Booleans.
• GenConsCar returns a symbolic object representing the Car of a
generalized cons. This is Car itself on the Cons symbolic object type,
or a concrete object constructed from the Car of the ConcrObj of a
cons-valued Concr object.
• GenConsCdr returns a symbolic object representing the Cdr of a
generalized cons, analogously to GenConsCar.
• GenConcrObj returns the unique possible value of a generalized con-
crete object. This may be obtained by traversing the outer cons structure
of the object, extracting the value from each Concr object within the
tree.
Each of these generalized accessors has a corresponding theorem showing its








In general, a symbolic execution progresses in much the same way as
a concrete execution. ACL2 uses an eager evaluation strategy: to execute a
function composition term f(g(x)), it first evaluates g(x) and subsequently f
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of the result. Similarly, to symbolically execute the term, GL first symbolically
executes g(x) and then symbolically executes f on the result.
However, in both ACL2’s concrete execution and our symbolic execu-
tion strategy, if is evaluated lazily as a special case. To concretely evaluate
an if term
if test then then else else,
ACL2 first evaluates test , yielding a value which determines which of the
branches to execute: if the result is the special symbol NIL (signifying false),
else is evaluated; otherwise, then. In symbolic execution of the same term,
GL similarly first symbolically executes test . However, the resulting value may
be a symbolic object that may be NIL (false) under some environments and
non-NIL (true) under others. Therefore, GL may need to symbolically execute
both branches. To make this determination, the GL control-flow algorithm
first analyzes the result of the test to determine whether it is constant-true,
constant-false, or may take either value. If it is constant, then only one branch
needs to be symbolically executed. Otherwise, both branches are symbolically
executed and their results are merged into a single symbolic value representing
the symbolic result of the if term as a whole.
2.2.1 Path Conditions
Analyzing the test term in isolation may not be enough to avoid exe-
cuting branches that are unreachable, because the context in which the term
occurs affects the possible values of the test. For example, suppose that x may
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take the values 1, 2, or 3, and we are interested in the symbolic execution of
the following program:
1: if x ≥ 2 then
2: return 0;
3: else




Analyzing the test on line 4 in isolation does not reveal that only one
of its branches is possible; indeed, the test is true for x = 2 and false for x = 1.
However, x is constrained by the previous test to be less than 2 at this point;
thus the control flow cannot reach that block with an even value of x. So, to
avoid needlessly symbolically executing f(x), we must consider the context in
which the test occurs.
To do this, we use a scheme similar to that described by King [53].
For a particular execution path to be realizable in a concrete execution, the
values taken by the tests in each if term along that path must be consistent.
Therefore, when analyzing a test to determine its possible truth or falsehood,
GL checks the test values for consistency with a path condition, represented as
a uBDD, which is accumulated from previous tests along the current execution
path. Whenever symbolic execution follows a then or else branch, the path
condition is updated by conjoining it with the test or its negation, respectively.
This prevents symbolic executions from following execution paths containing
39
contradictory if tests.
The path condition represents the portion of the input space that is
relevant to the current symbolic execution. Earlier, when we described the
correctness condition of symbolic executions, we omitted the path condition
as an input parameter for simplicity; our symbolic executions still conform to
this condition when the path condition is true. To be more precise, we only
expect the correctness condition to hold for environments on which the path
condition holds. Therefore, recalling the definition of symbolic execution in
Section 1.2, we define a symbolic execution of function f on s under path
condition pc as a computation producing s′, where
∀e . 〈pc〉bdd(e)⇒ 〈s′〉(e) = f (〈s〉 (e)) .
2.2.2 Analyzing If Tests
GL’s analysis of if tests aims to construct a BDD which reflects the
truth or falsehood of the symbolic value of the test. This is complicated by
the possible presence of App and Var objects in that symbolic value. In
absence of these forms, a symbolic object can be syntactically transformed
into a BDD that has the same truth value, under all assignments, as the
original object. However, the Var form does not permit this because its truth
value is independent of a BDD variable assignment, and the App form does
not permit this because the semantics of applied functions are not considered
during this analysis. Therefore, the analysis algorithm instead produces a pair
of BDDs: the first, k (“known”), represents the domain on which the analysis
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was able to determine the truth value, and the second, v (“value”), represents
the truth value when it is determined.
This analysis is implemented by the function Gtests, which takes the
symbolic object s to be analyzed, and the path condition pc (represented as
a BDD). We have proven in ACL2 the following correctness theorem which
describes the intended operation of Gtests:
Theorem 2.2.1 (Correctness of Gtests). Let
(k, v) = Gtests(s, pc).
Then for all environments e satisfying 〈pc〉bdd(e) and 〈k〉bdd(e),
〈s〉(e)⇔ 〈v〉bdd(e).
The Gtests algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. (Recall that we use
¬∗, ∧∗, etc. to denote BDD operations.) This algorithm analyzes the input
object s by cases on its type. For most of the symbolic object types, the
analysis is trivial. For all types other than App, Var, and Ite, the truth
value is known. The Cons and Num types are unconditionally known true,
since all concrete values represented by these objects are non-NIL, and for the
Atom and Concr types the truth value is simply determined by fixing the
represented object to a Boolean. The truth value for a Bool object is its BDD
field. App and Var objects are unknown, so that the truth value returned is
irrelevant (we arbitrarily choose NIL).
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Algorithm 2
1: procedure Gtests(s, pc)
2: if s is a Num or Cons then
3: return (T, T)
4: else if s is a Bool then
5: return (T,BoolBdd(s))
6: else if s is an Atom then
7: return (T, if s then T else NIL)
8: else if s is a Concr then
9: return (T, if ConcrObj(s) then T else NIL)
10: else if s is an App or Var then
11: return (NIL, NIL)
12: else . s is an Ite
13: test ← IteTest(s)
14: (ktest , vtest)← Gtests(test , pc)
15: allk test ← (pc ⇒∗ ktest) = T
16: if allk test ∧ (pc ⇒∗ vtest) = T then
17: return Gtests(IteThen(s), pc)
18: else if allk test ∧ (pc ⇒∗ ¬∗vtest) = T then
19: return Gtests(IteElse(s), pc)
20: pcthen ← pc ∧∗ (vtest ∨∗ ¬∗ktest)
21: pcelse ← pc ∧∗ (¬∗vtest ∨∗ ¬∗ktest)
22: (kthen , vthen)← Gtests(IteThen(s), pcthen)
23: (kelse , velse)← Gtests(IteElse(s), pcelse)
24: v ← BddIte(vtest , vthen , velse)
25: kbranches ← BddIte(vtest , kthen , kelse)
26: same ← vthen ⇔∗ velse
27: k ← BddIte(ktest , kbranches , same ∧∗ kthen ∧∗ kelse)
28: return (k, v)
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The Ite case is the only complicated one. First the Ite object’s test is
analyzed in a recursive call. In lines 15 through 19, Gtests checks whether the
test is either known to be constant true under the pc, in which case Gtests
recurs only on the IteThen field, or constant false, in which case Gtests
recurs only on the IteElse. In both cases the appropriate pc for the recursive
call is the current one, since that branch is followed under all the cases that
the current path is followed.
Otherwise, in lines 20–21 the pc is adjusted for each of the branches.
The computation of the pc values for the two branches reflects the conditions
under which each branch might be reachable. There are two conditions under
which a branch is determined to be unreachable: if its containing Ite expres-
sion is itself unreachable (¬∗pc), or if the test’s value is known to be the one
under which the other branch is taken (¬∗vtest ∧∗ ktest for the then branch,
vtest ∧∗ktest for the else branch). When the test value is not known, it does not
rule out the reachability of either branch. The new pc values for the branches
represent the case where neither of these unreachability conditions hold.
Wherever the truth value of the Ite object is known, it is simply the
BDD if-then-else of its test and branches, computed on line 24. The condition
under which this value is known is more complicated. If the test is known,
then the object’s truth value is known if the relevant branch is known. If the
test is unknown, then the object’s truth value is only known if both branches
are known and their truth value is the same. The BDD combining these cases
is computed on line 27.
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Analysis of an if test using Gtests allows us to determine a new path
condition for each branch; this, in turn, determines whether both branches or
just one must be symbolically executed. A given branch must be executed
under conditions where the current path condition holds and either the test’s
truth value is unknown or it corresponds to the direction of that branch: true
for the then branch, false for the else branch. Therefore, given the current
path condition pc and values
(ktest , vtest) = Gtests(test , pc),
the new path conditions for the then and else branches are pc∧∗(¬∗ktest∨∗vtest)
and pc ∧∗ (¬∗ktest ∨∗ ¬∗vtest), respectively. If one of these path conditions is
NIL (constant-false), then that branch is skipped. The path condition given
at the top level of a symbolic execution should be either true or non-constant;
therefore it is an invariant that the current path condition is never constant-
false. Under this invariant, at least one of the branches always has a satisfiable
path condition and therefore one or both of the branches is always run.
2.2.3 Merging Branches
If one of the branches has a constant-false path condition, then the
symbolic result of the if term is simply the result of symbolically executing the
other branch.1 Otherwise, GL symbolically executes both branches and must
merge both symbolic results into a single symbolic value. This result must
1On the other hand, if one of the branches has a constant-true path condition, the other
branch’s must be constant-false.
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take the value of the then branch when the test evaluates to true and of the
else branch when the test evaluates to false. This object is constructed using
the results (ktest , vtest) from the Gtests analysis and the results sthen and selse
from the symbolic executions of the two branches. This takes the following
form:
MkIte(MkBool(ktest),
IteMerge(vtest , sthen , selse , pc),
MkIte(stest , sthen , selse)).
Here, IteMerge is a function that constructs a new symbolic object repre-
senting an if-then-else among the BDD vtest and the two symbolic objects sthen
and selse , under the assumption of the pc. Under this assumption and the cor-
rectness statement of Gtests above, this term reduces to the if-then-else of
the symbolic results from the test, then, and else branches, as desired.
The correctness condition required of IteMerge is described by the
following theorem, which we have proved in ACL2:
Theorem. For all environments e such that 〈pc〉bdd(e),
〈
IteMerge(vtest , sthen , selse , pc)
〉




To satisfy this correctness requirement, it would suffice to produce a
new Ite object as follows:
MkIte(MkBool(vtest), sthen , selse).
However, rather than creating a new Ite object, it is often possible to merge
the two branches into a simpler structure, which is generally preferable. For
example, when the two branch results are both Bool objects, the if-then-else
may be merged into a single Bool whose value is the BDD if-then-else of
vtest and the BDD values of the two branch objects. Our implementation of
IteMerge merges the two branches whenever they conform to one of the
following five cases:
• They are equal. Their merge is then their identical value.
• They are both general numbers (as defined in Subsection 2.1.2): ei-
ther Num objects, Concr objects whose values are numeric, or numeric
atoms. Their merge is then the numeric object formed from the BDD








• They are both general Booleans: either Bool objects, Concr objects
whose values are Boolean, or Boolean atoms. Their merge is the Boolean
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• They are both general conses: either Cons objects or Concr objects
whose values are conses. Their merge is the recursive IteMerge of













• They are both App objects applying the same function. Their merge is









In addition to cases in which sthen and selse conform to one of the above
conditions, IteMerge also specially handles cases where one or both are Ite
objects whose IteTest fields are of the Bool type. In this case, IteMerge
walks over the Ite structures of sthen and selse to find pairs of sub-branches,
one within sthen and one within selse , which may be merged.
To simplify the process of finding mergeable pairs of sub-branches, Ite-
Merge maintains an invariant on the Ite structures of symbolic objects:
• Ite nests are structured such that the IteThen branches are never them-
selves Ite objects. Therefore, iterating over the Ite structure of an object
involves a list-like traversal, recurring on the IteElse branch, rather
than a tree-like traversal in which IteMerge would need to recur on
both branches.
• Non-Ite leaves are ordered within each object. This ordering gives some
precedence to every symbolic object, where the precedence for two ob-
jects is equal if and only if those two objects are mergeable, meeting
one of the five conditions described above. In a non-nested Ite object,
the IteThen branch must have higher precedence than the IteElse
branch, and in any nested Ite, the outermost IteThen branch must
have higher precedence than the IteThen of the IteElse branch.
Note that this invariant implies that there is at most one branch of such an
Ite structure that is a general Boolean, at most one branch that is a general
number, etc. Because Ite branches are strictly ordered by precedence and
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mergeable objects have equal precedence, an Ite may not contain two branches
that are mergeable.
IteMerge operates under the assumption that the sthen and selse in-
puts obey this invariant. Under this assumption a linear traversal of the Ite
structures of these objects suffices to complete the merge, producing a result
that also obeys the invariant. This linear traversal, similar to that of a merge-
sort, ensures that if the Ite branches in sthen and selse are sorted, then the
merged result will also be sorted.
The linear traversal of the branches’ Ite structures operates by sepa-
rating the two input objects each into a head and tail . The head of an object
is the IteThen branch if the object is a Ite with Bool test, and the whole
object itself if not. The tail is the IteElse branch or else, arbitrarily, NIL;
the tail is irrelevant in the non-Ite case. IteMerge checks the relative prece-
dence of the two head objects. If they have equal precedence, then they are
merged and IteMerge is called recursively on the two tails, composing the
merged heads and tails into a final Ite object when necessary. Otherwise, as in
a mergesort, IteMerge recurs by merging the tail of the object whose head
took precedence with the entirety of the other object. Again, IteMerge then
creates an Ite node combining the selected head with the merged tails.
While the sorting and structure invariant is algorithmically convenient
and helps to find mergeable objects, it is only heuristic. If either or both of the
branches do not obey the invariant, the IteMerge algorithm still conforms
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to its correctness claim, though the object produced may not be sorted or
maximally merged.
2.2.4 Full Control Flow Algorithm
The full algorithm for handling of a control branch is described in pseu-
docode in Algorithm 3. In this listing, inputs test , then, and else are the sub-
terms of an if block. Rather than implementing this algorithm as a function,
we instead define it as a macro, effectively replicating this code structure wher-
ever we require a symbolic if-then-else expression. This structuring allows us
to evaluate the branches lazily. In this pseudocode listing, we use the notation
SExec(term, pc) to denote symbolic execution of the given term under the
given path condition.
To evaluate an if-then-else expression, we first symbolically execute the
test under the current path condition and analyze the result using Gtests.
The results ktest and vtest describe the Boolean conditions under which the test
is known and true, respectively. These allow us to compute the appropriate
new path conditions for each of the branches. A given branch is relevant (its
path condition is true) only if the top-level path condition is true, and only if
the test either produced the value indicating that branch or else an unknown
result. New path conditions representing these conditions are computed in
lines 4–5.
The path conditions for the branches indicate whether or not they must
be symbolically executed: if the path condition for a branch is NIL, then there
50
Algorithm 3
1: function SExecIf(test , then, else, pc)
2: stest ← SExec(test , pc)
3: (ktest , vtest)← Gtests(stest , pc)
4: pcthen ← pc ∧∗ (¬∗ktest ∨∗ vtest)
5: pcelse ← pc ∧∗ (¬∗ktest ∨∗ ¬∗vtest)
6: if pcthen 6= NIL then
7: sthen ← SExec(then, pcthen)
8: else
9: sthen ← NIL
10: if pcelse 6= NIL then
11: selse ← SExec(else, pcelse)
12: else
13: selse ← NIL
14: pcmerge ← pc ∧∗ ktest
15: smerge ← IteMerge(vtest , sthen , selse , pcmerge)
16: sunknown ←MkIte (stest , sthen , selse)
17: return MkIte (MkBool(ktest), smerge , sunknown)
is no environment under which that branch is reachable, and we may skip its
evaluation. We arbitrarily assign NIL as the symbolic result of an unreachable
branch.
After computing the symbolic values of the branches, these values must
be merged into a single result. As described in Subsection 2.2.3, we use sep-
arate merging strategies for the situations where the test’s value is known or
unknown. When the test is unknown, we simply produce an Ite of the three
symbolic results. When the test is known, we call IteMerge in order to sim-
plify the merger of the two branches. Since this merge is only relevant when
the test is known, we perform the IteMerge under a new path condition
which conjoins ktest with the original path condition.
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To ensure the correct operation of our control flow algorithm, we have
proved a metatheorem stating the following correctness result. This uses the
correctness theorems of Gtests and IteMerge along with the evaluation
properties of the Ite and Bool types.
Theorem. For all environments e satisfying 〈pc〉bdd(e), and letting pcthen and
pcelse be defined as in the definition of SExecIf,
〈
SExecIf(test , then, else, pc)
〉




The ACL2 logic includes several primitive functions whose behavior is
constrained by axioms, such as +, Cons, Car, and Stringp. Other func-
tions, whether user-defined or built-in, either are recursively defined in terms
of these primitives or, like the primitives, are constrained by axioms but not
defined. Our code transformer and symbolic interpreter both permit symbolic
execution of any functions that are recursively defined in terms of functions
with defined symbolic counterparts. However, we have no automated mecha-
nism for generating symbolic counterparts for functions that are constrained
rather than defined, so we have manually defined symbolic counterpart func-
tions for the primitives and proven their correctness by conventional theorem
proving.
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We follow certain conventions when defining symbolic counterparts. For
each function f of arity n, we define its symbolic counterpart fsym so that the
following properties hold, and prove them where applicable.
Arity. fsym has arity n+ 2; the first n formals correspond to the formals of f ,
and the additional two are the path condition pc and a natural number
sdepth measuring the stack depth of the symbolic execution in order to
ensure termination.
Guards. fsym is Common Lisp compliant under the guard that its first n
formals are well-formed symbolic objects, pc is a well-formed BDD, and
sdepth a natural number.2
Well-formedness. fsym produces a well-formed symbolic object.
Correctness. fsym satisfies the symbolic counterpart correctness criterion:
for all environments e satisfying 〈pc〉bdd(e),〈
fsym(s1, . . . , sn, pc, sdepth)
〉
(e) = f (〈s1〉 (e) , . . . , 〈sn〉(e)) .
When our code transform generates symbolic counterpart functions
from an existing function definition, the control structure mirrors that of the
2ACL2 features a mechanism called guards, which allow ACL2 functions to be soundly
executed by the underlying Lisp. A function’s guard determines which inputs to that func-
tion are well-formed. One may perform a certain proof to verify the guard of a function,
which shows that execution of that function in Common Lisp behaves as ACL2’s logical
semantics dictate provided its inputs are well-formed. If a function’s guard is not verified,
then a ACL2 instead executes a “safe” version of its definition which is faithful to the ACL2
logic even in the case of badly-typed arguments [48]. In certain cases the safe version may
be drastically slower than raw Lisp execution.
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original function. In contrast, most manually defined symbolic counterparts
split into cases based on the symbolic object types of the inputs. First, as a
special case, when all of the symbolic inputs are general-concrete objects (sat-
isfying GenConcrP), then the original function is called on their GenCon-
crObj values. This allows symbolic executions to short-circuit into concrete
executions when all of the inputs to the function are concrete. Then, if any
input is of the Ite type, the symbolic counterpart recurs on one or more of the
branches, depending on the analysis of the test object under the path condi-
tion; this process is similar to the SExecIf algorithm. If any inputs are App
and Var forms, these are usually handled by creating a new App wrapping
the symbolic arguments.
Handling the Ite, App, and Var cases eliminates three of the eight
symbolic object types. The inputs are then known to be of one of the types
Atom, Cons, Concr, Bool, or Num. Usually, these are regrouped into
categories according to the type of object represented rather than the type
of the symbolic object; these categories are delineated using the generalized
recognizers GenBoolP, GenNumP, etc., described in Subsection 2.1.2.
ACL2 primitives often are intended to only operate on a certain type;
inputs of the wrong type are typically fixed to some value. For example,
arithmetic operations usually consider non-numeric inputs equivalent to zero.
This helps to reduce the number of cases that must be considered in each
symbolic counterpart definition; all inputs not in the general number category
may be fixed to zero, after which all operands are known to be general numbers.
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Once a symbolic counterpart has focused on a case in which operands
are known to be a particular type, the implementation either simply performs
syntactic manipulations of the input objects or else uses uBDD operations to
implement some symbolic manipulation. Most of the situations in which uBDD
manipulation is required occur within arithmetic-related functions. For these
we use helper functions that simulate bit-level arithmetic implementations on
lists of uBDDs; for example, we use a ripple-carry algorithm to implement
symbolic additions. We prove these algorithms correct and use these results
to prove the symbolic counterpart correctness criterion for each symbolic prim-
itive.
In certain cases, a primitive symbolic counterpart may produce an App
object representing the application of itself to its symbolic arguments rather
than performing a more explicit symbolic computation. For example, our
symbolic implementations of most arithmetic operations will only perform
uBDD-based arithmetic on symbolic integers, since symbolic arithmetic on
rationals and complex numbers tends to be impractically expensive. These
operations produce an App object when given a symbolic input which could
represent a non-integer.
When necessary for performance, the user may hand-code a symbolic
counterpart rather than allowing it to be generated automatically. However,
this generally requires a high degree of proof effort, so automatic generation
is usually preferred. We have hand-coded and proven the necessary properties
of symbolic counterparts for several non-primitive functions, such as Common
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Lisp’s bitwise logical operations; these have ACL2 function definitions that are
very inefficient to symbolically execute directly. We have also done this for an
and-inverter graph evaluation routine that is used in our hardware verification
efforts; this is described in Section 4.2.
2.4 Symbolic Counterpart Generation
To generate symbolic counterparts for a set of non-primitive functions,
GL includes a code transformation routine that may be applied to each func-
tion definition. This code transformation replaces each term in the function
body with a new term that carries out a symbolic execution of the original
term. In this section we describe the code transformation algorithm and our
strategy for automating the correctness proofs of the resulting symbolic coun-
terparts.
All steps of the code transformation operate on ACL2 translated terms.
In this subset of the ACL2 language, there are only four syntactic forms: vari-
ables, constants, lambda applications, and function applications. In particular,
this subset does not include macros or the let form. Every well-formed ACL2
term may be translated by expanding away macro calls and replacing let forms
with equivalent lambda applications. The syntactic forms are structured as
Lisp S-expressions, as follows:
Variable. v, a legal variable symbol.
Constant. (QUOTE obj), where obj may be any ACL2 object.
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Lambda application. ((LAMBDA (v1 . . . vn) body) a1 . . . an), where body is a
subterm, v1 . . . vn is a duplicate-free list of legal variable symbols which
includes all free variables in body , and a1 . . . an is a list of subterms. In
mathematical notation, we write
(λv1, . . . , vn . body)(a1, . . . , an).
Function application. (f a1 . . . an), where f is a function symbol of arity
n and a1 . . . an is a list of subterms. In mathematical notation, we write
f(a1, . . . , an). As a special case, f may be if, in which case there are
three arguments and we instead write if a1 then a2 else a3.
Our code transformation generates a symbolic counterpart for a func-
tion essentially by replicating the structure of its definition, but substituting a
symbolic counterpart call for each function call and a control flow code struc-
ture for each if term. In order to do this, every function called in the definition
must already have a symbolic counterpart defined. Therefore, as the first step
to generating a symbolic counterpart for a given set of functions, the code
transformation algorithm first constructs their complete call graph and ob-
tains a topological ordering of all functions in that graph, then generates their
symbolic counterparts in that order.
The code transformation routine also proves that the functions gener-
ated are indeed symbolic counterparts, showing that for fsym generated from
original function f ,
〈pc〉bdd(e)⇒
〈
fsym(s1, . . . , sn, pc, sdepth)
〉
(e) = f (〈s1〉 (e) , . . . , 〈sn〉(e)) .
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These proofs require a suitable symbolic object evaluator eval(s, e) = 〈s〉(e).
As described in Section 2.1.1, evaluators differ in the set of functions they
recognize in App objects. A symbolic counterpart generated for a function f
may create App objects representing calls of f — in particular, when sdepth
is exhausted, it produces such an App object in order to terminate immedi-
ately while still ensuring that the above equation holds. Therefore, the code
transformation introduces a new evaluator that recognizes every function for
which a symbolic counterpart is to be created. It additionally includes every
function that any previous evaluator recognizes, so that the new evaluator will
be backwards compatible with previously defined evaluators. For previously
introduced symbolic counterparts, this backward compatibility allows existing
symbolic counterpart correctness theorems to be updated to ones formulated
in terms of the new evaluator.
To streamline the proofs done in the course of symbolic counterpart
generation, it is helpful to ensure that these proofs involve only small terms.
To do this, the code transform algorithm generates a factored version of each
function for which a symbolic counterpart is to be generated, replacing certain
subterms of its translated body by calls of newly introduced subfunctions. In
particular, each if term and lambda application in each function is replaced
with an equivalent term that is a call of a newly-introduced function. In
practice, this keeps the size of each generated function small enough that proofs
involving these functions are feasible. After defining each such new function,
the code transform algorithm proves that it is equal to the corresponding
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subterm of the original function.
For if terms, factorization works as follows. Suppose the term in ques-
tion is
if test then then else else.
The factorization algorithm first recurs on the three subterms, producing new
terms test ′, then ′, and else ′, along with theorems showing that they are equal to
the corresponding original subterms. Suppose that the collective free variables
of then and else are v1, . . . , vn, and that x is a variable that is not among these.
(Factorization preserves the free variables of the term, so these are also the
free variables of then ′ and else ′.) The algorithm then defines a new function
equivalent to the original if term. Taking AnonIfFn to be some symbol not
previously defined as a function, the factorization routine defines
AnonIfFn(x, v1, . . . , vn) = if x then then
′ else else ′
and proves the theorem
AnonIfFn(x, v1, . . . , vn) = if x then then else else.
Finally, the algorithm returns
AnonIfFn(test ′, v1, . . . , vn),
which is equivalent to the original if term.
The factorization algorithm replaces lambda applications by a call of a
new function that is defined as the body of the lambda. Suppose the term is
(λv1, . . . , vn . body)(a1, . . . , an).
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As with if terms, our factorization algorithm first recurs on each subterm,
obtaining body ′, a1
′, . . . , an
′, and theorems showing their equivalence to the
original subterms. It then generates a function to replace the lambda body;
here suppose AnonLambdaFn is not a previously defined function and that
v1, . . . , vn are the free variables of body (and therefore of body
′). The algorithm
defines
AnonLambdaFn(v1, . . . , vn) = body
′
and proves
AnonLambdaFn(v1, . . . , vn) = body .
(There are no unbound variables in this function definition, since every lambda
in a translated ACL2 term binds all free variables of its body.) Finally, the
algorithm returns
AnonLambdaFn(a1
′, . . . , an
′),
which is equivalent to the original lambda application.
The factorization algorithm introduces a top-level factored function
that takes the same formals as the original function and whose body is the
factored body of the original function. Given the theorems produced during
factorization, it is trivial to prove this function equal to the original function.
The code transformation that creates symbolic counterparts operates
on the factored functions. In topological order according to the call graph, the
code transform creates symbolic versions of each factored subfunction. Since
lambda applications are eliminated by factorization, the code transformation
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needs to act only on the other three syntactic types of term. It operates as
follows:
Variable. Unchanged.
Constant. Most constants are well-formed symbolic objects representing
themselves, and are unchanged; other constants are replaced by a Concr
object representation.
Function application. The code transform is recursively applied to the func-
tion’s arguments. Then:
• If the function is not if, apply the function’s symbolic counterpart
to the transformed arguments and the current pc and sdepth.
• When the function is if, replace the if term by a term implementing
the SExecIf algorithm of Section 2.2. The calls to SExec in that
listing are each replaced by the appropriate transformed argument,
under a rebinding of pc when necessary.
The transformation of the top-level factored function also inserts a
preamble before the transformed body. First, this preamble fixes each symbolic
argument to a well-formed symbolic object and pc to a well-formed uBDD. It
uses ACL2’s MBE (for “must be equal”) facility [36] to do this without affect-
ing execution speed: the symbolic counterpart’s guard requires each argument
to be well-formed; under this guard, the fixing operation is the identity, so
when executing this function with guards satisfied, this operation may be
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soundly skipped. Next, the preamble checks whether all symbolic arguments
are general-concrete, and if so, calls the original function on their concrete
values and returns this concrete result. Finally, the preamble addresses termi-
nation, checking whether the stack depth is exhausted; if so, an App object
is returned representing the application of the original function to the sym-
bolic arguments. Otherwise, the transformed body is called under a binding
of sdepth to one less than the input sdepth.
Termination of the generated symbolic counterparts is proven by an ar-
gument about sdepth. For any recursive function or mutually-recursive clique,
the symbolic counterparts of its factored subfunctions form a mutually re-
cursive clique: the generated symbolic counterpart of the top-level factored
functions, which include preambles, are considered to be the symbolic coun-
terparts of the original functions, and calls of the original functions within the
factored bodies are translated to calls of these symbolic counterparts. ACL2
requires that termination be proved by specifying an ε0 ordinal-valued measure
function for each function in a mutually-recursive clique. The proof obligation
given such a set of measure functions is that for every recursive call in the
clique, the caller’s measure applied to its arguments is strictly greater than
the callee’s measure applied to its arguments [50]. The measure we choose for
symbolic counterparts is sdepth ·ω+idx . Here idx is a constant natural number
chosen for each factored function; it is zero for top-level symbolic counterparts
(those corresponding to the original functions of the mutually-recursive clique)
and one plus the maximum idx of a callee for all other functions in the clique.
62
This ensures that for a call from a top-level function to a subfunction, the idx
may increase but the sdepth decreases due to its binding in the preamble; and
for any other recursive call, the sdepth is preserved and the idx decreases. In
both cases, the ordinal measure decreases.
Once a symbolic counterpart function is defined, it remains to show
that it obeys the guard, well-formedness, and correctness conventions listed in
Section 2.3. (The arity convention is satisfied by construction.) While each of
these proofs is conceptually straightforward, they must be managed carefully
to ensure that they are fully automatic and their performance is acceptable.
Factorization helps to reduce the size of terms that must be considered in each
proof. Additionally, we select a minimal set of rewrite rules to make avail-
able to the prover and we give prover hints to control induction and function
expansion.
The proofs that symbolic counterparts produce well-formed symbolic
objects and that they obey the symbolic counterpart correctness constraints
are straightforward for non-recursive symbolic counterparts, using the correct-
ness and well-formedness conditions of each other symbolic counterpart called
in the body. For (mutually) recursive symbolic counterparts, these proofs are
completed by induction. In the typical case where the symbolic counterpart
is mutually recursive, the induction scheme is generated as a “flag function”
using the MakeFlag utility of Davis and the author [32].
The well-formedness and correctness conditions are not predicated upon
the well-formedness of the inputs: a symbolic counterpart must produce a well-
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formed and correct output regardless of the well-formedness of the inputs.
This is supported because the preamble fixes the inputs to well-formed ones.
This discipline makes the symbolic counterpart correctness and output well-
formedness proofs faster by reducing the number of hypotheses in the rewrite
rules that are applied during and produced by these proofs. The guard ver-
ifications that are necessitated by this discipline are themselves quite simple
since they primarily rely on rewrite rules produced from the well-formedness
proofs, which are hypothesis-free.
The reasoning for the well-formedness and correctness proofs primarily
uses the rewrite rules generated by the well-formedness and correctness theo-
rems of previously-introduced symbolic counterparts. A different approach is
preferred for proving the type and correctness conjectures of transformed if
terms. Each if of the original function is transformed into a complex structure
of if terms and lambda applications that implements the SExecIf algorithm;
the ACL2 rewriter will generally beta-reduce lambdas and case-split on if
tests, causing our proofs to grow substantially. Instead, we use a strategy in
which we prevent the rewriter from descending into this structure and use a
meta rule [40] to reduce the type and correctness conjectures to the respective
conjectures about the test and branch subterms. To prevent the rewriter from
descending into the structure, we use ACL2’s Hide function, an identity func-
tion that is specially recognized by ACL2’s rewriter and prevents the rewriter
from operating upon its argument.
Our efforts to make the introduction of symbolic counterparts and the
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associated proofs automatic and fast have made it practical to introduce sym-
bolic counterparts for moderately large programs; for proofs at Centaur Tech-
nology, we have generated symbolic counterparts for programs of around 1000
lines of code, implementing floating-point addition, among others. For this
program, 39 new symbolic counterpart functions were introduced, incorpo-
rating 424 factored functions. On an Intel Xeon E5450 processor, it takes
37 seconds to introduce the new evaluator, factored functions, and symbolic
counterparts and prove their guards, well-formedness, and correctness prop-
erties. However, in the next section we will discuss symbolic interpretation,
which offers a way to perform symbolic execution of functions for which no
symbolic counterparts have been generated.
2.5 Symbolic Interpretation
In addition to our code transform which generates symbolic counter-
parts, we have implemented symbolic interpretation as a second symbolic
execution strategy. This approach avoids introducing symbolic counterparts
and performing the associated guard and correctness proofs; newly introduced
functions may immediately be symbolically interpreted without first generat-
ing symbolic counterparts and performing the associated proofs. In the course
of proof development, it is common to repeatedly change certain function
definitions, and repeatedly regenerating the symbolic counterparts for these
functions often slows down the development process.
Interpreter-based symbolic execution is somewhat slower than execu-
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tion using symbolic counterparts: while the speed of BDD operations and
other symbolic object manipulation is the same between the two methods,
each interpreted function call imposes some overhead. This slowdown is es-
pecially bad in cases where the bulk of the cost is from deep recursion and
a relatively small portion is due to symbolic manipulation. The worst such
case is when the interpreter is operating on concrete values, and therefore
there is no symbolic manipulation. To alleviate this slowdown, GL allows
new symbolic interpreters to be defined which are capable of directly calling a
fixed set of functions on concrete arguments. Each new symbolic interpreter
may also directly call a fixed set of symbolic counterparts, typically all those
that were defined at the time of its definition. Thus symbolic interpreters are
parametrized by two sets of functions: those that the interpreter may call on
concrete arguments, and those for which the interpreter may call a symbolic
counterpart.
A symbolic interpreter operates at the meta level: the main input is a
quoted ACL2 term x, and the interpreter symbolically executes x on a binding
b of the free variables of x to some symbolic inputs, yielding a symbolic object
res . In stating and proving the correctness of a symbolic interpreter, we use
a term evaluator [15, 40, 51] to compute the meanings of quoted terms. This
allows us to integrate the interpreter into a verified clause processor [51], a
procedure that can be called to relieve goals within ACL2 proofs; we describe
this clause processor in Section 3.3. In the remainder of this section, we de-
scribe the interface of the interpreter, its correctness claim, and the algorithm
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implementing symbolic interpretation.
2.5.1 Interface and Correctness Claim
We previously defined a symbolic execution of a (unary) function f as
a computation that produces a symbolic object s′, satisfying
∀e . 〈s′〉(e) = f (〈s〉 (e)) .
This generalizes trivially to a function of n inputs:
∀e . 〈s′〉(e) = f (〈s1〉 (e) , . . . , 〈sn〉 (e)) .
We wish to show that symbolic interpretation is a method of performing such
a symbolic execution. That is, if symbolic interpretation of a term x yields
a result res , we wish to claim that res satisfies the above condition. This
requires a generalization of our view of symbolic execution since x is a data
object (a quoted term) rather than a function. The semantics of such terms
are given by a term evaluator Ev(x, a), which produces the value of x given
an assignment (association list) a of values to its free variables. If the free
variables of x are v1, . . . , vn, we then regard x as representing the function
fx = λi1, . . . , in . Ev (x, [(v1, i1) , . . . , (vn, in)]) .
The correctness claim for the symbolic interpreter is that its result res is a
symbolic execution of fx on the symbolic objects bound in the binding b. If b
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has the form [(v1, s1) , . . . , (vn, sn)], then the correctness claim is:
∀e . 〈res〉(e) = fx (〈s1〉 (e) , . . . , 〈sn〉 (e))
= Ev (x, [(v1, 〈s1〉 (e)) , . . . , (vn, 〈sn〉 (e))]) .
We use the notation 〈b〉alist(e) to denote symbolic object evaluation of the
bound values in an association list such as b; the same correctness claim may
then be expressed as
∀e . 〈res〉(e) = Ev(x, 〈b〉alist(e)).
Note, however, that symbolic interpretation is not guaranteed to produce a
valid symbolic execution result in all cases; the correctness theorem proven of
each symbolic interpreter has some hypotheses guarding the above correctness
claim.
A symbolic interpreter Interp takes a total of five arguments including
the term x and symbolic bindings b, and returns three values including the
symbolic execution result res . The arguments are (x, b, pc, sdepth,world), with
the following meanings:
• x: The term to be symbolically executed.
• b: The symbolic bindings; an association list giving a symbolic value for
each free variable of x.
• pc: The current path condition of the symbolic execution.
• sdepth: The stack depth limit.
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• world : ACL2’s current database of axioms, definitions, and theorems.
The three return values are (err , res , defs), described as follows:
• err : An error message, or false if there was no error.
• res : The result of the symbolic execution.
• defs : A collection of all definitions used during the symbolic interpreta-
tion.
The arguments pc and sdepth provide the same functionality as they
do in symbolic counterparts: pc is a uBDD that tracks the control condi-
tions under which the current path is executed, and sdepth forces termination.
Unlike in symbolic counterpart definitions, however, when the stack depth is
exhausted by the symbolic interpreter, an error is returned instead of a App
object. The world argument is used for looking up definitions of functions.
This allows an interpreter to symbolically execute functions that did not have
symbolic counterparts or did not exist at the time the interpreter was defined:
to symbolically execute a call of a such a function, the interpreter looks up
its definition and recursively symbolically interprets the definition body. This
implementation is described in the next subsection.
As mentioned above, a symbolic interpretation may encounter an error
if the stack depth runs out or, additionally, if it encounters a function that is
not defined. In such cases, a message describing the error condition is stored
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in the err return value; if an error message is returned, the symbolic execution
result res is considered invalid.
The final return value defs holds a collection of terms, representing all
definitional equations obtained from world that were used during the symbolic
execution. These definitions must be accurate in order for the symbolic exe-
cution to be correct. Typically, the world passed to an interpreter is ACL2’s
internally-maintained database and is known from an implementation perspec-
tive to contain correct definitions; however, there is no axiom reflecting this
implementation reality, and additionally, an interpreter could be called with
some other world containing incorrect definitions. Therefore, the interpreter
records in defs each definition used during the course of each symbolic execu-
tion; the correctness of the result of that symbolic execution is then predicated
on the correctness of these function definitions.
We are now ready to state the correctness theorem for symbolic inter-
preters. Essentially, the claim is that res is a symbolic execution of term x
under symbolic bindings b as described above, provided:
1. the interpreter does not produce an error,
2. all definitions used are correct: that is, each definitional equation eq ∈
defs evaluates to true under any assignment a,
3. the evaluation environment satisfies the path condition pc.
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Theorem (Symbolic interpreter correctness claim). Let
(err , res , defs) = Interp(x , b, pc, sdepth,world).
Then for any environment e,




⇒ 〈res〉(e) = Ev(x, 〈b〉alist(e)).
We prove this claim in ACL2 initially about a generic symbolic inter-
preter that does not recognize any functions, even the primitives for which
symbolic counterparts are predefined. In order to create useful symbolic inter-
preters, we provide a utility that defines a new interpreter capable of calling
any symbolic counterparts that are available at definition time, and a user-
provided set of functions for concrete evaluation. This utility functionally in-
stantiates the correctness theorem of the generic symbolic interpreter to show
that this also holds of the new interpreter.
2.5.2 Implementation
A symbolic interpreter recursively walks over its input term x sym-
bolically executing its subterms, then combines these results. As discussed
previously, terms may be of four types: variables, constants, lambda applica-
tions, and function applications, of which if applications are a special case.
An interpreter call Interp(x, b, pc, sdepth,world) first checks that sdepth is
not exhausted, returning an error message if it is, then splits into cases on the
type of x, as follows:
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Variable. Look up and return the binding of the variable name x in the
symbolic object bindings b.
Constant. Return the constant value of x, wrapped in a Concr form if nec-
essary.
Lambda application. Recursively interpret the terms given as actual pa-
rameters of the lambda application. Create a new association of the
lambda’s formals to the actuals, and interpret the lambda body under
this set of bindings.
If. As in the SExecIf algorithm of Section 2.2, interpret the test term, then
analyze its result to determine whether both or only one of the branches
must be taken. Interpret the branches as necessary, then return the
merged results.
Function application. Recursively symbolically interpret the terms given as
actual parameters of the function application. Then:
1. If the function has a symbolic counterpart known to this interpreter,
call that symbolic counterpart on the actuals.
2. Otherwise, if the results from the actuals are all concrete values and
the function may be directly executed by this interpreter, call the
function on the actuals.
3. Otherwise, look up the function’s body and formals in world ; if the
function is not defined, return an error message. Add the function’s
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definitional equation to defs . Create a new association of the func-
tion’s formals to the actuals, and symbolically interpret the body
of the function under this set of bindings.
Our symbolic interpretation scheme allows us to flexibly balance the
cost of automatically introducing symbolic counterparts with the interpreter
overhead. In practice, we have found that interpretation overhead is almost
never problematic except in cases where a function is interpreted on concrete
inputs, so that there is no symbolic manipulation. In this case, it suffices
to define an interpreter that has the problematic function among its set of
concretely executable functions. Furthermore, usually the culprits in these
cases are built-in ACL2 functions that are defined recursively in terms of the
ACL2 primitives, but which have Common Lisp implementations that have
different performance characteristics than their ACL2 definitions. For exam-
ple, the function Char, which finds the character at a given index in a string,
is defined in ACL2 as
Char(idx , str) = Nth(idx ,Coerce(str , list)).
This definition is linear-time, whereas Common Lisp implementations of this




We obtain proofs by symbolic execution by following the steps outlined
in Section 1.2: design a symbolic input vector that covers the set satisfying the
hypotheses and symbolically execute the theorem’s conclusion on these inputs.
If the symbolic execution yields a constant-true result and the coverage claim
can be proven, this suffices to prove that the hypotheses imply the conclusion.
We have developed considerable automation to ease the process of proving
theorems via these steps.
First, we implemented a procedure based on BDD parametrization
which automatically narrows the coverage sets of symbolic inputs based on
a hypothesis; we describe this in Section 3.1. This procedure makes it easier
to construct a symbolic input vector that covers the inputs satisfying a hy-
pothesis but that does not cover extraneous inputs that, since they do not
satisfy the hypothesis, likely also do not satisfy the conclusion. For example,
consider the theorem “all non-prime natural numbers between 2 and 16 are
divisible by 2 or 3.” It is relatively simple, in our symbolic object format, to
manually create a symbolic object that covers the set of naturals less than 16;
it is much more involved to create one that covers only the non-primes greater
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than 1. But symbolically executing the conclusion “x is divisible by 2 or 3”
on the former will yield the counterexamples 1, 5, 7, 11, and 13. A simple
solution is to rephrase the theorem as “for all natural numbers x less than 16,
x is prime, or is less than 2, or is divisible by 2 or 3.” However, it is often the
case that it is slower to symbolically execute a function on inputs covering a
large set than a small one. Our parametrization procedure solves this prob-
lem by automatically narrowing a symbolic object covering more inputs than
necessary to one that only covers those satisfying the hypothesis.
In Section 3.2 we describe a methodology, including supporting lemmas
and proof automation techniques, that reduces the user effort required to prove
that a symbolic input vector truly covers all inputs satisfying the hypotheses.
While such coverage proofs are in general undecidable, in practice our method-
ology completes them automatically with at most a few simple hints from the
user.
Finally, we have implemented a verified clause processor that automates
the process of introducing theorems by symbolic execution, as we will describe
in Section 3.3. Our clause processor supports both the basic steps described
in Section 1.2 as well as a case-splitting mode in which the top-level theorem
is proven using several symbolic executions which each cover a subset of the
relevant input space. The clause processor performs the symbolic executions
and obtains the required side conditions to complete the proof.
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3.1 Symbolic Input Generation
To prove a theorem by symbolic execution following the method de-
scribed in Section 1.2, one must provide a symbolic object for each free vari-
able of the theorem. These symbolic objects must cover every possible setting
of these free variables satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem. For perfor-
mance, it is usually best to construct these objects so that their coverage set
is as small as possible while meeting this requirement.
Constructing symbolic objects with a specific coverage set by hand is a
challenging and error-prone process. For example, suppose the hypotheses to
a theorem are as follows:
a, b, c ∈ N, a < 64, b < 64, c < 16, −c < a− b < c. (3.1)
It is easy to create a symbolic input vector that covers the set satisfying these
hypotheses. It suffices that a, b, and c be symbolic integers of the appropriate
bit lengths with each bit an independent BDD variable. It is also easy to re-
strict each two’s-complement sign bit to false so that the coverage set includes
only nonnegative integers. However, it is much more difficult to restrict the
coverage set to only those input vectors satisfying −c < a− b < c. Construct-
ing the component BDDs for the bits of these numbers would require a great
deal of effort without algorithmic support.
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3.1.1 Support for Narrowing of Coverage
BDD parametrization [5, 26] offers a method of automatically gener-
ating symbolic inputs with coverage restricted to those values which satisfy
a particular predicate. BDD parametrization effectively substitutes specially
constructed expressions for the variables of the Boolean formula represented by
each BDD. These expressions have the property that their possible values cor-
respond to exactly those settings of the variables that cause the parametriza-
tion predicate to be satisfied. There may be many possible such parametrizing
substitutions for a given predicate; the BDD parametrization algorithm finds
one such substitution. For example, suppose the predicate is v1 ⊕ (v2 ∨ v3).
One possible parametrizing substitution would be
v1 ← ¬(w1 ∨ w2)
v2 ← w1
v3 ← w2.
This is an acceptable parametrizing substitution because the substitution ap-
plied to the predicate yields ¬(w1 ∨w2)⊕ (w1 ∨w2), which is a tautology, and
of the eight possible settings of v1, v2, v3, the four that satisfy the predicate are
achievable by some setting of w1, w2. In general, a parametrizing substitution
for a predicate p is of the form
v1 ← fp1 (w1, . . . , wm)
...
vn ← fpn(w1, . . . , wm)
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which we abbreviate using vector notation:
~v ← ~fp(~w).
It is generally desirable that m be smaller than n when possible, since having
fewer variables speeds up BDD computations. The parametrization procedure
we use does not always minimize m, but it never produces a substitution in
which m exceeds n.
The substitution must satisfy the following two conditions with respect
to the parametrization predicate p; we consider these to be the definition of a
parametrizing substitution.
• Precision. For all settings of the parametrized variables ~w, the predi-
cate holds of the parametrizing expressions:
∀~w . p(~fp(~w)). (3.2)
Because the parametrizing expressions never produce extraneous values
that do not satisfy the predicate, we say they are precise.
• Generality. For every setting of the original variables ~v satisfying the
predicate, there is a setting of the parametrized variables such that the
parametrizing expressions equal these values:
∀~v . p(~v)⇒ ∃~w .~fp(~w) = ~v. (3.3)
Because the parametrizing expressions may produce any value satisfying
the predicate, we say they are general.
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Our BDD parametrization procedure is adapted from the Cnst algo-
rithm of Coudert and Madre [26] to apply to uBDDs. The algorithm applies
the parametrization of a predicate p to an individual BDD x, effectively ap-
plying the parametrizing substitution without computing it explicitly. (The
substitution may be computed by applying the algorithm to each BDD vari-
able.) Our algorithm, Parametrize(p, x), is shown in Algorithm 4. Here the
predicate p, which must not be constant-false, is represented as a uBDD, and
x is the uBDD to which we are applying the parametrizing substitution. In
the uBDD representation, the depth within the tree implicitly indicates the
variable of each node; each non-constant node only contains “then” and “else”
subtrees. The constructor Mk-uBdd(a, b) creates a node in which a is the
Then and b is the Else branch. In this algorithm, for the cases where p and
x are non-constant, the variable of the top node of both uBDDs is implicitly
the same.
Algorithm 4
1: function Parametrize(p, x)
2: if p = false then
3: return error
4: else if p = true or x is constant then
5: return x
6: else if Then(p) = false then
7: return Parametrize(Else(p),Else(x))





13: return Mk-uBdd(a, b)
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The critical property of this algorithm is that its result represents the





(~y) = 〈x〉bdd(~fp(~y)). (3.4)
The particular substitution that is used is not important for our purposes,
aside from the fact that it obeys the precision and generality conditions listed








An important consideration about the parametrization process is the sensi-
tivity of BDDs to variable ordering. While parametrization by a complicated
predicate may disrupt the variable ordering chosen, in practice the algorithm
tends to preserve the ordering relationship among the variables.
Suppose s is a symbolic object that covers a superset of the values
recognized by a hypothesis Hyp(x). We wish to obtain a new symbolic object
s′ which covers only those values satisfying Hyp(x). To do this, we first
symbolically execute Hyp on s. This yields a symbolic object sp = Hypsym(s)
whose truth value is the predicate that we will use for parametrization. We
extract a BDD representing this truth value using the Gtests function of
Section 2.2. Recall from Section 2.2 that Gtests produces two BDD values
k, v, giving the conditions under which the truth value of the input can be
determined, and the conditions under which it is true. Let
(kp, vp) = Gtests(sp, T).
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If sp contains App or Var forms, then its truth value cannot be fully deter-
mined and kp will be falsifiable. Some of these unknown values may reflect
cases where the hypothesis is satisfied; therefore, we include these unknown
values in our parametrization predicate. Specifically, we assign
p = vp ∨∗ ¬∗kp.
We then parametrize each BDD in the representation of s using this predicate,
yielding a new symbolic object s′; the function performing this transformation
is called Parametrize-Gobj.
The following two theorems express the result of this transformation,
stated in terms of the variables introduced above. Theorem 3.1.1 proves that
if s covers the set recognized by Hyp, then so does
s′ = Parametrize-Gobj(p, s);
this will be key to our coverage proof strategy in Section 3.2. Theorem 3.1.2 is
not important for coverage proofs or any soundness claim, but assures us that,
at least in the case where the symbolic execution of Hyp produced a known
result, s′ covers exactly the desired input set.
Theorem 3.1.1. For all environments e satisfying Hyp(〈s〉(e)), there exists
e′ for which 〈s〉(e) = 〈s′〉(e′).
Theorem 3.1.2. If kp = T, then Hyp(〈s′〉(e)) holds of all environments e.
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To prove these theorems, recall that each BDD b′ in the representation
of s′ is the parametrization by p of the corresponding BDD b in the represen-







= 〈b〉bdd(~fp(e)) (by Equation 3.4)
and therefore
〈s′〉(e) = 〈s〉(~fp(e)). (3.5)
Here, as a notational convenience, we leave implicit the non-BDD variable
bindings (supporting the Var form) in symbolic object environments. When
we apply such an environment to a BDD, we mean to strip these bindings out,
and when we apply an operator such as ~fp we mean for it to simply preserve
these bindings.
For the proof of Theorem 3.1.1, note that Hyp(〈s〉(e)) implies 〈p〉bdd(e);
this follows from Theorem 2.2.1 regarding Gtests and the definition of sym-
bolic execution, Equation 1.1. Therefore, using the generality property of the
parametrizing substitution (Equation 3.3), there exists e′ for which ~fp(e′) = e.
Then, using Equation 3.5,
〈s′〉(e′) = 〈s〉(~fp(e′)) = 〈s〉(e).
We have proved both of these theorems in ACL2; a sketch of their
proofs follows. For Theorem 3.1.2, by the precision property of the parame-
trizing substitution, we have 〈p〉bdd(~fp(e)), and since kp = T, 〈vp〉bdd(~fp(e)).
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By the correctness of Gtests and the symbolic execution, this implies that
Hyp(〈s〉(~fp(e))), and therefore Hyp(〈s′〉(e)).
Recall the example of Equation 3.1, in which a, b, c are hypothesized
to be natural numbers of a certain bit-length, but additionally restricted by
the condition −c < a − b < c. Using our parametrization scheme, a user
could simply provide symbolic objects covering the full possible range of each
variable. By symbolically executing the hypothesis on these inputs and then
parametrizing them using the resulting predicate, a new set of symbolic objects
corresponding to a, b, and c is created which covers only the values allowed by
the hypothesis.
3.1.2 Support for Case Splitting
In addition to narrowing a symbolic input to one of minimal or near-
minimal coverage, parametrization may also be used to split a proof by sym-
bolic execution into subcases. In some cases, it takes less time and memory
to run multiple symbolic executions on small coverage sets whose union is
the complete set of interest than to run a single symbolic execution covering
the whole set. Of course, the reverse is also often true; otherwise, exhaustive
concrete simulation would be preferable to symbolic execution.
Our system provides automation for case-splitting and allows the user
a high degree of flexibility in specifying the cases and the symbolic inputs
to be used in each case. Because different cases may benefit from different
BDD orderings, our system allows the original, unparametrized symbolic input
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vector to be chosen individually for each case to be considered. The case split
is specified by an additional hypothesis that restricts coverage to a subset
of the full input space; we symbolically execute the conjunction of the top-
level hypothesis and the case hypothesis in order to obtain the parametrization
predicate. The theorem’s conclusion is symbolically executed separately on the
parametrized symbolic inputs resulting from each case, and each case generates
a corresponding coverage obligation.
When using case-splitting, a basic soundness requirement is that the
cases considered must cover the space recognized by the top-level hypothesis.
That is, it must be proven that for every input vector satisfying the top-level
hypothesis, the additional hypotheses of at least one of the cases must be
satisfied. This proof may itself usually be completed by symbolic execution
without case-splitting. Full automation for proof by case splitting, including
this additional proof, is built into the GL clause processor, as described in
Section 3.3.
3.2 Coverage Proofs
Proof of coverage is a requirement for any proof using symbolic execu-
tion; a symbolic execution produces no information regarding concrete inputs
that are not in its coverage set. The coverage theorem states that if an input
vector is of interest in the top-level theorem (i.e., it satisfies the hypotheses),
then it is in the coverage set of the symbolic inputs to be used in the symbolic
execution. For the case of a single variable and a choice s of the symbolic
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input object, the necessary theorem takes the form of Equation 1.3:
∀x . Hyp(x)⇒ ∃e . x = 〈s〉(e).
Proof of coverage is undecidable, in general, due to the fact that the
hypothesis may be arbitrarily complicated. In fact, any ACL2 theorem may be
phrased as a coverage requirement with an appropriate choice of the hypothesis
function and symbolic object. Given any conjecture F(x), let s be the constant
NIL, and define
Hyp(x) = ¬(F(NIL) ∧ F(x)).
The coverage conjecture then reduces to
∀x .
(
(F(NIL) ∧ F(x)) ∨ x = NIL
)
which, given the existence of non-NIL objects is:
F(NIL) ∧ ∀x . (F(x) ∨ x = NIL)
or equivalently
∀x . F(x).
A separate potential difficulty in coverage proofs, independent of the
complexity of the hypotheses, is the possibility of interdependent BDDs present
in the symbolic objects. To compute the joint coverage of several BDDs is,
in general, a difficult computational problem. Even resolving the question of
whether a single concrete value is covered is NP-complete; for example, any
CNF satisfiability problem can be rephrased in polynomial time as the question
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of whether a set of BDDs each encoding a clause may all be simultaneously
true. Therefore, coverage proofs are, at least in principle, difficult on two
fronts: undecidable if the hypotheses are complicated, and NP-complete if the
symbolic input in question is complicated.
However, it is rarely the case that the user supplies an input vector
for symbolic simulation without knowing what coverage is desired. In general,
the user has a coverage set in mind and designs the symbolic inputs to fit it,
aided by techniques such as the parametrization method discussed in Section
3.1. Furthermore, the hypotheses of theorems amenable to symbolic execution
tend to include simple restrictions of the types and sizes of inputs; otherwise,
it would be unclear to the user how to approach creating a suitable symbolic
input.
To heuristically aid in proving these conjectures, we have developed a
methodology in which coverage proofs may often be completed automatically,
and usually require only a small amount of user input. This methodology
makes use of BDD parametrization, depending in particular on Theorem 3.1.1,
which states that if some symbolic input vector s covers the set recognized by
a hypothesis Hyp, then the result of parametrizing s using Hyp is another
symbolic input s′ which also covers that set.
In our methodology, we begin with a symbolic input vector s that obeys
certain restrictions that make its coverage easy to compute; s must cover the
set recognized by the hypotheses, but it typically covers a superset. Applying
parametrization to s yields a new input vector, s′, whose coverage is smaller,
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but by Theorem 3.1.1 is still sufficient; often, the coverage of s′ is exactly the
set recognized by the hypotheses.
The restrictions we place on the initial, unparametrized symbolic input
vector are as follows.
1. Each BDD appearing in a Bool or Num object must be a unique BDD
variable.
2. Each Var form must have a unique name.
3. No App forms are allowed.
The first restriction eliminates interdependencies between the BDDs present
in the object, making each bit in the symbolic representation a free, indepen-
dent variable. The second restriction similarly eliminates interdependencies
between Var forms. The third restriction is necessary since there is no syn-
tactic method available to determine the coverage of an App form.
3.2.1 Shape Specifiers
To enforce and clarify these restrictions, our user interface requires
descriptions of the symbolic inputs in a format that is distinct from, albeit
similar to, that of symbolic objects. We call objects of this format shape
specifiers. The shape specifier format has the same syntactic types as the
symbolic object format, except for App, which is not allowed. In the Num
and Bool types, which in the symbolic object format require BDD fields,
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these BDDs are replaced by natural numbers indicating the indices of BDD
variables. A further restriction on valid shape specifiers is that the BDD
variable indices and the Var names appearing throughout the shape specifier
must be duplicate-free. To transform a shape specifier into the unparametrized
symbolic input vector, we define a function SSpec-To-SObj that simply
replaces each BDD variable index i with the corresponding BDD variable vi.
We define the coverage set of a shape specifier as the coverage set
of the symbolic object derived from that shape specifier using SSpec-To-
SObj. Due to the unique-variable restriction, computing the coverage set of a
shape specifier is much simpler than the NP-complete problem of computing
the coverage set of an arbitrary symbolic object. In Algorithm 5 we define a
function SSpec-Covers(s, x) that determines whether a given concrete value
x is covered by the shape specifier s, as shown by its correctness theorem:
∀x, s . SSpec-Covers(s, x)⇔ ∃e . x = 〈SSpec-To-SObj(s)〉(e).
This allows us to restate coverage obligations without an existential quantifier:
∀x . Hyp(x)⇒ SSpec-Covers(s, x). (3.6)
In the coverage proofs seen in symbolic executions, the shape specifier s is a
constant given by the user, and because SSpec-Covers is a recursion over
s it readily expands and reduces to a series of type and size requirements on
components of x.
The definition of SSpec-Covers is listed as Algorithm 5. In the Atom
and Concr cases, s only covers its single value, so x is only covered if it
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Algorithm 5 Computing coverage of shape specifiers
1: function SSpec-Covers(s, x)
2: if s is an Atom then
3: return x = s
4: else if s is a Concr then
5: return x = Concr-Obj(s)
6: else if s is a Bool then
7: return Booleanp(x)
8: else if s is a Num then
9: return Numberp(x) ∧NumSpec-Covers(Num-Bits(s), x)
10: else if s is s Var then
11: return true
12: else if s is an Ite then
13: test-true ← SSpec-Covers-Iff(Ite-Test(s), true)
14: test-false ← SSpec-Covers-Iff(Ite-Test(s), false)
15: then-cov ← SSpec-Covers(Ite-Then(s), x)
16: else-cov ← SSpec-Covers(Ite-Else(s), x)
17: return (test-true ∧ then-cov) ∨ (test-false ∧ else-cov)
18: else . s is a Cons
19: if Consp(x) then
20: car -cov ← SSpec-Covers(Car(s),Car(x))
21: cdr -cov ← SSpec-Covers(Cdr(s),Cdr(x))




equals that value. In the Bool case, either Boolean value may be covered by
assigning it to the variable index of s. If s is a Var, then it covers every possible
object. If s is a Num, we call an auxiliary function NumSpec-Covers which
checks whether each component of x — the real and imaginary numerator and
denominator — are within the range of the lists of indices in s. If s is an Ite,
we first check the possible truth values of the test subfield, using the auxiliary
function SSpec-Covers-Iff. This function is similar to SSpec-Covers, but
checks only whether an object of the same truth value as x is covered. Then it
must be the case that either the test may be true and the then branch covers
x, or that the test may be false and the else branch covers x. Finally, if s is
a Cons specifier, then x must be a cons and the corresponding components
must recursively satisfy SSpec-Covers.
3.2.2 Proving Coverage with Shape Specifiers
We provide rewrite rules to open calls of SSpec-Covers and compute
the coverage set of the supplied shape specifier. These rewrite rules do not
support Ite forms or Num forms that may represent non-integers, since in
the usage modes we have seen so far, these forms have not been used in inputs
to symbolic executions. On the other hand, these rules give special support to
lists of Booleans, which are used frequently. The supplied set of rewrite rules
may be extended by the user. Examples of these rules are listed in Figure 3.1.
The following example illustrates the operation of these rewrite rules
on a coverage obligation. Let Hyps(a, b, c) be the formula listed in Equation
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SSpec-Covers(Num(bits), x) 
Integerp(x) ∧ −2|bits|−1 ≤ x < 2|bits|−1 (SSpec-Covers-Int)








a is an Atom







Boolean-Listp(x) ∧ |x| = |s|
(SSpec-Covers-Bool-List)
Figure 3.1: Rewrite rules for SSpec-Covers
91
3.1, and let us assign the following shape specifiers to a, b, and c, respectively:
sa = Num([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7])
sb = Num([8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14])
sc = Num([15, 16, 17, 18, 19]).
The following coverage obligation, derived from Equation 3.6, is generated by
this assignment and hypotheses: 3.1:
∀a, b, c . Hyps(a, b, c)⇒ SSpec-Covers([sa, sb, sc], [a, b, c]).
Three applications of the rewrite rule SSpec-Covers-Cons reduce this to




The final conjunct is eliminated using SSpec-Covers-Atom, and the others
are reduced by SSpec-Covers-Int, yielding
∀a, b, c . Hyps(a, b, c)⇒ Integerp(a) ∧ −26 ≤ a < 26
∧ Integerp(b) ∧ −26 ≤ b < 26
∧ Integerp(c) ∧ −24 ≤ c < 24.
Each of these conjuncts is implied by the hypotheses, so the coverage obligation
is met.
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In addition to these rewrite rules, we supply a computed hint scheme
that is designed to heuristically expand functions within the hypotheses in
a well-organized manner. This scheme is based on the observation that a
hypothesis is often a conjunction of predicates about separate components of
the inputs. For example, often an input variable is required to be a tuple, each
element of which must have a particular type. These computed hints focus on
one component of the tuple at a time, expanding predicates that seem relevant
to the proof obligation for that component and throwing out any hypotheses
that do not concern that component to avoid slowing down the prover.
These hints and rewrite rules automate coverage proofs in many com-
mon cases. However, the user still may need to intervene in the proof de-
pending on the nature of the symbolic inputs and the hypotheses. Our user
interface supports such intervention. The user may provide additional rewrite
rules to increase the reasoning capabilities used during the proof. It is also
often the case that some subfunctions within the hypotheses are unnecessary
for the coverage proof, and expanding these will only slow down the proof; we
therefore allow the user to specify a list of functions that will not be expanded
by our computed-hint mechanism. Finally, in the worst case, the user may dis-




We provide automation for proof by symbolic execution using verified
clause processors [51], which are custom proof procedures for ACL2 that are
proven (via an ACL2 proof) to be sound. In this section we first give a high-
level description of clause processors and how they are verified, then describe
the clause processors that we provide in support of proof by symbolic execu-
tion.
3.3.1 Verified Clause Processors
A clause processor is a custom proof procedure for ACL2 that operates
on the level of proof obligations (goals). Each such obligation is represented
as a clause, a list of terms whose disjunction is the goal to be established.
A clause processor takes a clause as input and produces a list of clauses as
output. ACL2 uses a clause processor by applying it to a prover goal, creating
a new prover subgoal for each output clause returned. If each such subgoal is
proved, this is assumed to be sufficient to prove the original subgoal.
A clause processor may be verified by an ACL2 proof showing that
whenever each output clause is a theorem, the input clause is also a theorem.
Once a clause processor is verified, ACL2 may use it to simplify proof goals
without introducing unsoundness. The correctness claim for a clause processor
verification may be stated using Ev to denote the function that, given an ACL2
term and an assignment of values to its free variables, produces the value of the
term under that assignment. “Clause c is a theorem” may then be phrased as
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∀a . Ev(Disjoin(c), a), where Disjoin creates a term that is the disjunction




∀a′, c′ . c′ ∈ f(c, h)⇒ Ev(Disjoin(c′), a′)
)
⇒ ∀a . Ev(Disjoin(c), a).
(3.7)
Here f is the clause processor function in question, c and c′ are understood as
clauses, a and a′ are understood as association lists giving value assignments
for the variables of the clauses, and h is an arbitrary input “hint” for f .
This correctness claim cannot be stated in the first-order ACL2 logic
because the function Ev cannot be defined. However, one can instead state
and prove a first-order theorem that implies this correctness claim by replac-
ing the fully general evaluator with one that has defined behavior on only a
fixed set of functions [15, 51]. Intuitively, every fact that is known about this
evaluator is also true of the universal evaluator; therefore, if one can prove
the correctness theorem about the limited evaluator, then it must hold in gen-
eral. Therefore, to verify a clause processor in ACL2, one is required to prove
a theorem similar to the claim above, but where Ev is replaced by such a
partially-defined evaluator function and the inner quantifier is eliminated by
Skolemization. The form of the theorem proved is as follows, where g may be
any function of c, h, and a, and Conjoin-Clauses takes a list of clauses and
returns a term representing the conjunction of the disjunctions of the terms of
each clause:
∀c, h, a . Ev
(





A variation on this scheme is also allowed: the clause processor function
may take the ACL2 state1 as an additional argument and produce a triple
of values consisting of a flag indicating an error, the result clauses, and the
modified state; in this case, the same proof obligation is required to hold under
the condition that there was no error.
3.3.2 GL Clause Processors
The clause processors used for proof by symbolic execution are paired
with corresponding symbolic interpreters; recall from Section 2.5 that the user
may define a new symbolic interpreter in order to support direct execution of
a particular set of functions. A macro is provided that creates both a new
symbolic interpreter and a verified clause processor that calls that interpreter
to performs symbolic execution. These clause processors take the ACL2 state,
primarily for access to function definitions, and may produce errors.
Each such clause processor has a basic mode of operation in which
the proof is attempted with a single symbolic execution, and a case-splitting
mode in which multiple symbolic executions are used to cover the space of
possibilities in pieces. We first describe the simpler, non-case-splitting mode.
1The ACL2 state is a special object that allows access to, among other things, the ACL2
logical world, a structure which records all of the function definitions and theorems currently
known to the logic. The state also contains a globals table for data storage, and additionally
provides access to functionality such as file system access and random number generation,
which cannot be soundly described in the logic as functions of typical objects. Instead, the
logical story supposes that each access causes an irreversible change to the state, so that
the same function may not be applied to the “same” state more than once.
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3.3.2.1 Non-Case-Splitting Mode
In addition to the clause itself, the non-case-splitting mode requires
additional arguments. First, an argument bindings assigns shape specifiers to
each free variable of the theorem. These are used as a basis for generating
symbolic inputs through the parametrization process described in Section 3.1.
Next, arguments hypothesis and conclusion describe the division of the clause
into hypothesis and conclusion. These are necessary because in clausal form,
the terms forming these portions of the theorem are indistinguishable, but they
play very different roles in proof by symbolic execution. The clause processor
uses the given hypothesis and conclusion terms, rather than the clause itself,
as the basis for the symbolic execution. To justify this, it creates a proof
obligation stating that if the hypothesis implies the conclusion, then the clause
itself holds. Since the hypothesis and conclusion should be a simple division
of the clause into two parts, relieving this proof obligation is usually a matter
of simple tautology checking.
The clause processor checks several error conditions. The hypothesis
and conclusion terms must be syntactically well-formed terms. The bindings
must contain a shape specifier for each free variable of the theorem, and the
shape specifiers must be well-formed, with no duplicate BDD variable indices
or Var names among them; this is required for our coverage methodology as
discussed in Section 3.2.
After checking for these error conditions, the clause processor performs
the parametrization procedure of Section 3.1. Assuming that the user-provided
97
shape specifiers cover the set of inputs satisfying the hypothesis, this process
creates symbolic inputs s′ that more narrowly cover this set; typically s′ covers
only and exactly those inputs satisfying the hypothesis. The conclusion is then
symbolically executed on the generated symbolic inputs s′, yielding a symbolic
result sres = Concl(s
′). To determine whether the result is always true, sres
is checked using Gtests, yielding (kres , vres) = Gtests(sres , T). Then,
• If the kres and vres BDDs produced by Gtests are both constant true,
then we conclude that, for covered inputs, the theorem’s conclusion is
always true.
• If kres ∧∗ ¬∗vres is satisfiable, then we have a definite counterexample;
the clause processor may generate several satisfying assignments from
this BDD and evaluate the generated symbolic inputs under these as-
signments in order to display these counterexamples to the user.
• Otherwise, the clause processor performs a similar procedure for ¬∗kres .
The resulting assignments may or may not be true counterexamples, but
hopefully will reveal to the user why the symbolic execution yielded a
result containing App or Var forms.
3.3.2.2 Case-splitting Mode
When case splitting is desired, the clause processor requires additional
input from the user to characterize the set of subcases to be considered and,
for each subcase, the input object shapes and BDD orderings to be used in
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the symbolic execution. To characterize the subset of the input space to be
considered in each subcase, the user provides an additional case hypothesis that
does not appear in the final theorem. The case hypothesis involves additional
variables that are not present in the theorem; we will refer to these as case
parameters. At a given setting of the case parameters, the case hypothesis
restricts the values of the free variables of the theorem to some subset of their
possible values. To specify the case-split to be used, the user provides a list
of assignments of concrete values to the case parameters; the case hypothesis
under each assignment determines that subcase’s restriction on the theorem’s
variables.
For illustration, suppose our theorem’s free variable was an integer x,
and that we wished to split into cases based on whether x is even or odd. To
specify this case split, one might supply the case hypothesis
if parity then Oddp(x) else Evenp(x),
where parity is a case parameter, and the two assignments parity = T and
parity = NIL.
In proofs with case-splitting, it is often important for performance to
use a different BDD ordering for each subcase. Therefore, each case parameter
assignment is accompanied by a binding list of the theorem variables to shape
specifiers, to be used for generating the symbolic inputs for that subcase. Each
subcase therefore incurs its own coverage proof obligation: the provided shape
specifiers must be shown to cover the space recognized by the conjunction of
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the main theorem hypothesis and the case hypothesis with the given parameter
assignment.
Case-splitting additionally incurs an obligation to show that the sub-
cases are sufficient to cover the entire input space recognized by the theorem’s
hypothesis. Specifically, if the theorem’s hypothesis is satisfied by an assign-
ment of values to the theorem’s free variables, then for at least one of the
listed case parameter assignments, the case hypothesis is also satisfied. This
may itself be proved by symbolic execution; the user provides an additional set
of shape specifier bindings specifically for this proof obligation. These shape





The GL framework is designed to provide symbolic execution capabil-
ities for arbitrary ACL2 functions, but it is particularly useful in hardware
verification. In such applications, typically a property or specification is writ-
ten as an ACL2 function, and the goal is to prove that a hardware model
satisfies this property or meets this specification. There are many possible
ways to model hardware. In this chapter we describe an approach to hard-
ware modeling that has been used at Centaur Technology for several successful
verifications; a case study of one such verification is described in Chapter 5.
We model hardware in the E hardware description language [13], a
formally defined HDL that is deeply embedded [57] in ACL2. Each module
of the hardware design is represented as an ACL2 constant object called an E
module. The operation of these modules may be simulated by an ACL2-based
HDL simulator called Emod. This simulator may be used to run concrete
test cases, and may also symbolically simulate the modules in order to extract
Boolean formulas representing the circuit logic of blocks of interest.
In our verification process, we receive the design as Verilog RTL files [1].
We mechanically translate these Verilog sources to E modules [44]; this trans-
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lation step is unverified. We can compare our E translations to the original
Verilog by running tests on our translations using Emod and on the Verilog
sources using commercial Verilog simulators. To perform proofs about a trans-
lated hardware module, we use Emod to symbolically simulate the module
using and/inverter graphs (AIGs) [56] as the Boolean function representation.
This yields a set of AIGs1 giving the outputs and next-state functions of the
hardware module in terms of the inputs and previous states. We have proven
that evaluating these AIGs produces results that are equal to those produced
by concrete simulation with Emod.
Figure 4.1 shows the progression of models in this verification process.
Here the dotted arrows indicate steps that are unverified or extralogical, and
solid arrows indicate steps that we have verified with respect to one another.
In this chapter we will describe our strategy for proving theorems about
our hardware models. In Section 4.1 we discuss the E hardware description
language and the Emod simulator. Then in Section 4.2 we will describe the
AIG-based method by which we symbolically execute our hardware models
inside GL proofs.
1In most AIG implementations, all AIG nodes are stored in one network that may have
many output and/or latch nodes. In our ACL2 implementation, each AIG is a rooted tree
where the root node is the output value. Therefore, we tend to speak of multiple AIGs
rather than a single AIG with multiple outputs. The common structures of all AIGs are
shared via structural hashing in both cases.
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Figure 4.1: Hardware Modeling and Simulation
4.1 The E Hardware Description Language
The E hardware description language, developed by Boyer and Hunt
[13, 43], is an occurrence-based, hierarchical HDL that is deeply embedded in
the ACL2 logic. It is related to other formal hardware description languages
such as HEVAL [17], DUAL-EVAL [18], and DE2 [42]. Each hardware unit
modeled in the E language is a data object, called an E module, defined as
a constant in ACL2. The semantics of these hardware objects is given by an
interpreter function, Emod, written in ACL2.
The Emod interpreter runs in several modes. It can perform sym-
bolic simulations in either two- or four-valued logics (four-valued simulations
are necessary to model constructs such as bidirectional buses and tristate
drivers). In these symbolic simulations, one may use either BDDs or AIGs
as the Boolean function representation. A concrete simulation is performed
by running a symbolic simulation with concrete input and state values. Emod
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can also perform conservative dependency analysis and delay estimation.
The E language is a hierarchical, gate-level language. Each module is
either a predefined primitive, such as a basic single-bit gate or latch, or a hier-
archical module containing a netlist of submodules. The semantics of primitive
modules are built into Emod, whereas hierarchical modules are simulated by
recursively simulating their submodules.
The submodules within each hierarchical module are listed in a certain
order that may include duplicates. To simulate a hierarchical module, Emod
recursively simulates its submodules in the given order. At each submodule
occurrence m in this order, Emod extracts the inputs of m from the current
settings of the signals, and recursively simulates m on those inputs. The signal
settings are then updated by setting the signals connected to the outputs of m
to the values produced by the recursive simulation. In order for this simulation
to yield realistic results, the occurrences should be ordered so that the final
duplication of each occurrence occurs after its inputs have settled to their final
values.
The E language has a phase-based timing model. A module is simulated
with a given setting of its input signals, and it is assumed that these input
values are held long enough for all wires in the circuit to settle to new steady-
state values. An Emod simulation operates on an input and initial state
vector. It produces an output and final state vector, signifying the values






((:u o0 :o (sum) :op *xor2* :i (a b))





((:u o2 :o out :op *ff* :i (sum-reset))
(:u o0 :o (sum c) :op *half-adder* :i (c-in out))
(:u o1 :o (sum-reset) :op *and2* :i (sum reset-))
(:u o2 :o out :op *ff* :i (sum-reset)))))
Figure 4.2: Emod examples
respectively, after each wire has reached a new steady state.2 There is no
explicit unit of delay in this timing model. Thus, certain constructs may not
be accurately modeled by E modules generated from the Verilog translator;
however, the Centaur design is largely restricted to a subset of Verilog that
may be modeled in the E language.
A simple example of the E language syntax is shown in Figure 4.2. In
this example, we define a half-adder and a one-bit counter in terms of the
primitives *xor2*, *and2*, and *ff*.
Each module and occurrence definition consists of several fields labeled
by keyword symbols :i, :o, :occs, etc. The list of occurrences is given by
2These “vectors” are not necessarily just lists; E allows input, output, and state vectors
to be organized in more complex ways.
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:occs, and the connectivity among the module occurrences is given by the :i
(input) and :o (output) fields of the modules and occurrences. Each occur-
rence has a name given by its :u field. Note that the *counter* module’s
occurrence list contains a duplication of instance o2. The first occurrence is
necessary to set its output signal out according to the stored state value, and
the second is necessary in order to update the state with the newly calculated
value sum-reset.
While simulations run using Emod are symbolic in general, useful prop-
erties about hardware modules are most clearly expressed as statements about
concrete-value simulations. For example, the correctness of the *counter*
module might be stated as follows:
Theorem. Let cin, reset, and st be Booleans, and let
(nextst , out) = Emod(’TWO,*counter*,List(cin, reset),List(st)).
Then
nextst = out = reset ∧ (st ⊕ cin).
In this example, the TWO flag determines that Emod will run a two-
valued, BDD-based symbolic simulation; however, for any instance of this the-
orem in which the hypotheses are satisfied, the inputs to this Emod simulation
are concrete, Boolean values.
Symbolic simulation can be used to prove such theorems because we
have shown that Emod symbolic simulation is faithful to concrete simula-
tion. The commutative diagram in Figure 4.3 illustrates the meaning of this
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Symbolic Inputs Symbolic Results








Figure 4.3: Emod commutativity with evaluation
correspondence: the same concrete results may be obtained either by first eval-
uating some symbolic inputs and running a concrete simulation using Emod,
or by running a symbolic simulation using Emod and subsequently evaluating
the symbolic results. The following theorem, which has been proved in ACL2,
states the correspondence for the two-valued AIG mode; similar theorems hold
for the four-valued AIG and two/four-valued BDD modes.
Theorem 4.1.1 (Emod commutes with Aig-Eval). Let m be a well-formed
module, isym a well-formed two-valued AIG input vector for m, ssym a well-
formed two-valued AIG state vector for m, and env an assignment of Boolean
values to the variables of i and s, and let:
iconcr = Aig-Eval-Vec(isym, env),
sconcr = Aig-Eval-Vec(ssym, env),
(s ′sym, osym) = Emod(’AIG,m, isym, ssym),
(s ′concr, oconcr) = Emod(’AIG,m, iconcr, sconcr).
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Then
s ′concr = Aig-Eval-Vec(s
′
sym, env), and
oconcr = Aig-Eval-Vec(osym, env).
Here the well-formedness conditions are syntactic checks on the mod-
ule and the symbolic input/state vectors, requiring, for example, that they
contain the right number of AIGs. Aig-Eval is a function that determines
the Boolean value of an AIG given an assignment env of Boolean values for
each of its variables, and Aig-Eval-Vec(v, env) is a function that applies
Aig-Eval(a, env) to each AIG a in the vector v.
These theorems can be used to define a GL symbolic counterpart for
Emod. A fully general symbolic counterpart for Emod would allow symbolic
executions in which the (GL object) symbolic inputs to Emod themselves
represented (BDD or AIG) symbolic values. Instead, we wish to run symbolic
executions in which the (GL object) symbolic inputs to Emod represent con-
crete (Boolean or four-valued) values. To do this, we define a custom symbolic
counterpart for Emod which uses Emod itself as the underlying symbolic
simulation engine. This symbolic counterpart checks that the mode flag and
module inputs are concrete GL objects, the module is well-formed, and that
the provided input and state vectors are symbolic (GL) objects that always
represent well-formed, concrete (Boolean or four-valued) input/state vectors
for the module. That is, while these may be non-concrete symbolic objects,
each of their possible values is an input vector consisting only of constants,
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rather than non-constant BDDs or AIGs. We extract from these GL sym-
bolic objects a vector of BDDs, each representing the conditions under which
the corresponding input bit is true or false, and we run a BDD-based Emod
symbolic simulation on these vectors. The result is an output and next-state
vector of BDDs; we wrap each such BDD in a Bool object to create the output
of the Emod symbolic counterpart. Thus, our GL symbolic counterpart for
Emod uses Emod itself as its own symbolic simulator.
A major disadvantage of this strategy is that BDD-based symbolic sim-
ulations may be extremely inefficient. It is often the case that many internal
signals of the hardware module are irrelevant to the desired result; for ex-
ample, many arithmetic-related units perform several operations in parallel
but produce only the result of one of them, based on some data-dependent
logic. In such cases, Emod will symbolically simulate all of these operations
even though it may be that only one is relevant to the desired result. This
may be especially problematic when different internal signals of the hardware
module require different BDD orderings to efficiently represent their values
as a function of the inputs. These problems are remedied by the AIG-based
methodology described in the following section.
4.2 Symbolic AIG Evaluation
In order to avoid computing BDDs for irrelevant internal signals of a
hardware model, we perform Emod symbolic simulations using AIGs and sub-
sequently convert the resulting AIGs into BDDs. This is an effective strategy
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because it is relatively inexpensive to build AIGs representing the outputs of a
hardware module, and because it is possible to program algorithms that avoid
irrelevant and overly expensive computations while operating on AIGs. In this
section we will describe the algorithm we use to produce a BDD representation
from a set of AIGs representing the results of a hardware simulation, and how
this fits into our hardware verification methodology.
Suppose we wish to show that the result given by a specification func-
tion is equivalent to the result computed by a concrete Emod simulation of a
hardware model. As stated in Theorem 4.1.1, this Emod simulation is equiv-
alent to an evaluation of AIGs resulting from a sufficiently general symbolic
Emod simulation. We therefore may instead, equivalently, prove that the spec-
ification function is equivalent to that AIG evaluation. To prove this theorem
using GL, we need a symbolic counterpart for our AIG evaluation function.
The AIG evaluation function, Aig-Eval(x, env), is a simple recursive
evaluator for AIGs, given as Algorithm 6; it computes the Boolean value of
x, an AIG, given an environment env assigning Boolean values to each of the
inputs of x. We use the ACL2(h) memoization capability [12] to memoize
this function so that when it recurs on an AIG node whose value has been
previously computed for the current environment, it returns the recorded value
instead of recomputing it, thus ensuring that this function takes time linear
in the size of the AIG.
For hardware-related theorems, we wish to symbolically execute Aig-
Eval. To do this, we use a hand-coded symbolic counterpart rather than
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Algorithm 6 AIG evaluation
function Aig-Eval(x, env)
if x is Boolean then
return x
else if x is a variable then
return Lookup(x, env)
else if x is a negation then
return ¬Aig-Eval(x.child , env)
else . x is an AND node
return Aig-Eval(x.child1 , env) ∧Aig-Eval(x.child2 , env)
relying on the symbolic interpreter or the automated symbolic counterpart
generation. These automated methods perform poorly for two reasons. First,
the symbolic evaluation of a particular AIG subgraph is recomputed at every
visit to its root node; memoization avoids this problem in concrete executions
of Aig-Eval. Second, even if we were to memoize these computations, we
would still face a problem similar to that of BDD-based symbolic simulation
in Emod: often the values of many internal nodes of the AIG are irrelevant
to the final result, and computing their BDDs often causes blowups.
Our hand-coded symbolic counterpart for Aig-Eval is tailored to the
type of symbolic inputs we expect to occur in proving hardware-related theo-
rems. The AIG input x itself will be a (GL) concrete object, the result of an
Emod symbolic simulation. In the environment env , the variables of x may
be bound to (GL) symbolic Booleans. The result computed by our symbolic
counterpart will also be a symbolic Boolean expressing the function composi-
tion of the AIG with the variable bindings. Because GL’s symbolic Booleans
are expressed using BDDs, we compute this by producing a BDD representing
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Algorithm 7 AIG symbolic evaluation (naive algorithm)
function A2B(x, env)
if x is Boolean then
return x
else if x is a variable then
return Lookup(x, env)
else if x is a negation then
return ¬∗A2B(x.child , env)
else . x is an AND node
a← A2B(x.child1 , env)
b← A2B(x.child2 , env)
return a ∧∗ b
the function composition of the AIG x with the BDDs bound in env.
The core algorithm used by our hand-coded symbolic counterpart is
called Aig2Bdd and computes the AIG/BDD function composition for the
primary output node of the AIG [76]. A specification for this algorithm, called
A2B, is described in Algorithm 7; this specification simply computes the
AIG/BDD function composition for each node in the AIG. This specifica-
tion is amenable to memoization, but it performs poorly in practice because
it computes full BDD representations for many irrelevant AIG nodes. We de-
scribe certain cases where these irrelevant nodes occur and how the Aig2BDD
algorithm identifies and prunes them.
As we mentioned previously, hardware modules are commonly designed
to internally compute several different functions, but produce as output the
result of only one of these functions based on an opcode or other control signals.
In the AIG representations of such designs, the discarded function results occur
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as subgraphs in the AIGs of the outputs. Often, applying constant propagation
based on a setting of control signals for the operation in question will prune
out the irrelevant functionality from the AIGs. This is a very simple step
that could be applied to the AIGs as pre-processing before computing the full
AIG/BDD function composition.
However, in some cases the multiplexing is data-dependent. For exam-
ple, in some implementations of floating-point addition, two or more compu-
tations are performed in parallel, of which only one is expected to produce the
correct result. The result from the appropriate computation is chosen based
on the relative values of the signs and exponents of the two operands. In this
case, even when the coverage of a symbolic execution is limited so that all
covered inputs result in a particular path being chosen, constant propagation
is not sufficient to remove the irrelevant portions; stronger Boolean reasoning
is required. Furthermore, it is often prohibitively expensive to symbolically
execute the irrelevant paths, since a BDD ordering that works well for one
path may be inefficient for another.
We prune out these irrelevant AIG branches using methods similar
to the dynamic weakening strategy of Seger et al [74] and the incremental
symbolic simulation strategy of Paruthi et al [63]. Our Aig2Bdd algorithm
uses two distinct methods to prune irrelevant branches from the AIG. We call
these the substitution and bounding methods. Both methods associate AIG
nodes with approximate BDD representations conforming to a certain BDD
size bound. These approximate representations show that certain branches
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may be ignored, and are then iteratively tightened until an exact BDD re-
sult is obtained. Generally, bounding method is weaker but faster than the
substitution method.
In an AIG AND node with two children a and b, b is irrelevant if
it can be shown that a ⇒ b; in this case, the AND node may be replaced
by a. (One common situation is that a is constant-false.) The Aig2Bdd
algorithm successively applies the two approximation methods, each of which
can detect certain such implications without necessarily computing a full BDD
representation of a or b. In both methods, we begin at the leaves of the AIG and
build toward the root, computing exact BDD translations for nodes until some
node’s translation exceeds a size limit. We replace the over-sized BDD with a
new representation that loses some information but allows the computation to
continue. After the AIG’s output node is translated, we check to see whether
its BDD result is exact. If so, we are done; otherwise, we increase the size limit
and try again. During this translation process, we check each AND node for
an irrelevant branch and remove such branches from the AIG so that it will be
ignored in subsequent iterations. Heuristically, we use the (weaker) bounding
method first with small size limits, then switch to the substitution method at
a larger size limit.
In the bounding method, the translated value of each AIG node is two
BDDs that are upper and lower bounds for the exact BDD function compo-
sition, in the sense that the lower-bound BDD implies the exact BDD and
the exact BDD implies the upper-bound BDD. If the upper and lower bound
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BDDs for a node are equal, then they both represent the exact BDD trans-
lation for the node. When a BDD larger than the size limit is produced, it
is thrown away and the constant-true and constant-false BDDs are instead
used for its upper and lower bounds. If an AND node a ∧ b is encountered
for which the upper bound for a implies the lower bound for b, then we have
a⇒ b; therefore we may replace the AND node with a. Thus, using the weak
method we can, for example, replace an AIG representing a ∧ (a ∨ b) with a
whenever the BDD translation of a is known exactly, without computing the
exact translation for b.
In the substitution method, instead of approximating BDDs by an up-
per and lower bound, fresh BDD variables are introduced to replace over-sized
BDDs. We ensure that these variables are not reused. The BDD associated
with a node is its exact translation if it references only the variables used in
the primary input assignments. This catches certain additional pruning op-
portunities that the weaker method would miss; for example, it can replace
b 6= (a 6= b) with a.
We have proven in ACL2 that the Aig2Bdd algorithm is correct. It
may not always produce an exact BDD result if the maximum BDD size limit
is set too low; however, when it signals that an exact result has been produced,
that BDD result represents the function composition of the AIG and the BDD
inputs. We also prove that this BDD result is equal to the result of the simpler
A2B function [76].
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We use the Aig2Bdd algorithm as the core of our hand-coded sym-
bolic counterpart for the AigEval function. In this symbolic counterpart, we
require the symbolic input AIG x to be a general-concrete object (as defined
in Subsection 2.1.2, so that it has only one possible concrete value, which
we may determine syntactically. We also require that the symbolic environ-
ment, env , be concrete in its representation except in its bound values: the
keys must be of Atom type and the alist structure in which the values are
bound must be composed of simple Cons constructs, without, for example,
any Ite-type components. Furthermore, we must be able to extract a BDD
representing the unambiguous truth value of each bound value using Gtests;
that is, the bound values may not contain App or Var forms. When the
inputs meet these syntactic restrictions, we may extract a concrete AIG from
the general-concrete input x and an alist mapping atoms to BDDs from the
symbolic environment env ; these are suitable inputs for Aig2Bdd. Running
Aig2Bdd on these inputs results in a BDD that, when inserted into a Bool
construct, is the correct symbolic result. If either of the syntactic requirements
on the inputs are not met, we return an App object representing the call of
AigEval.
We prove the usual theorem (see Section 2.3) stating that this function
satisfies the definition of a symbolic counterpart for Aig-Eval. This proof
makes use of the correctness of the Aig2Bdd algorithm and also addresses
the extraction of the AIG and association list inputs.
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In our current hardware verification methodology, the theorems we pro-
duce concern evaluation of the AIGs resulting from a symbolic Emod simu-
lation of a hardware model. A more clear and elegant theorem would instead
state that some property holds of the Boolean results of all concrete Emod
simulations of the hardware model. Theorem 4.1.1 shows that symbolic sim-
ulation is faithful to concrete simulation; therefore, our AIG-related theorems
imply theorems of the second type. However, in practice it is tedious and con-
fusing to complete these proofs. The steps in such a proof are similar to those
described in Theorem 1.2.1, and we do not yet have a framework in place to
automate these steps. The coverage step, in particular, should be automated
to make this kind of proof practical.
As future work, we intend to explore approaches that ease the process
of introducing theorems based on Emod concrete simulations. One such ap-
proach is to design a GL symbolic counterpart for Emod which performs an
AIG-based symbolic simulation of the given module and then converts the re-
sults to BDDs in order to produce a GL-formatted symbolic result. However,
this lacks the capability to skip the BDD conversion for results that will not
be used; furthermore, when the theorem involves multiple phases of Emod
simulations, such a symbolic counterpart would convert all the intermediate
states and outputs to BDDs, even though some of them might not be relevant
to the final results.
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Chapter 5
Case Study: Floating-point Addition
We have used the GL framework at Centaur Technology to verify the
correctness of several operations in the execution cluster of the VIA NanoTM
processor, a commercial 64-bit x86 processor. The verified operations include
many media unit instructions, several multiplications, and the main iteration
of a divider. As a case study, this chapter describes the verification of the
floating-point addition instructions of the media unit, and focuses on the role
of the GL framework; other parts of the process are discussed in greater detail
elsewhere [43,44].
We would like to thank Terry Parks for several contributions to this
work, including an ACL2 specification for floating-point addition and a Verilog
parser written in Lisp.
5.1 Overview of Verification Methodology
The verification methodology used for the fadd unit is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.1. The hardware model to be verified is based on Verilog files developed
by logic designers. In Chapter 4, we described how Verilog RTL descriptions


































Figure 5.1: Centaur Verification Methodology
AIG-based symbolic simulation mode to produce formulas describing the out-
puts and next-states of our hardware modules as a function of the inputs and
previous states. We initially perform a very general simulation that covers a
large class of instructions. We then specialize the resulting AIGs by constant-
propagating the control signals for a particular instruction, generating a set of
AIGs specific to that instruction. In this constant-propagation process, we also
assign X (unknown) values to all signals that we expect to be irrelevant to the
operation of that instruction; this yields a conservative simplification of the
resulting AIGs. We also restrict relevant inputs to symbolic Boolean (non-X)
values, because we usually do not specify desired behavior of an instruction
119
when any of the relevant inputs are X.
We use GL to prove that the AIG formulas derived from the hardware
simulation conform to some specification as described by an ACL2 function.
For floating-point addition operations, we use the case-splitting feature of the
GL clause processor to avoid BDD size explosions. Parametrization, AIG to
BDD conversion, symbolic execution of the specification, and checking the
implementation for compliance with the specification are handled by the GL
clause processor. The result of this process is either a completed proof that
the hardware model meets our specification, or a counterexample showing that
it does not.
5.2 The fadd unit
Within the media unit of the Nano CPU, the fadd unit handles floating-
point addition and subtraction. This unit is highly optimized for low latency
arithmetic operations. It implements SIMD 32- and 64-bit floating-point addi-
tions as well as scalar x87 80-bit floating point additions and many of the other
operations from the SSE and SSE2 extensions to the x86 instruction set, such
as bitwise logical operations, shuffles, and min/max operations. All floating-
point addition operations are performed with a two-cycle latency; the fadd
unit can also forward results internally so that operations may be chained.
The fadd unit’s RTL-level design is 33,700 lines of Verilog composing
680 modules. It has 374 output signals and 1074 inputs including 26 clocks;
multiple clocks are used for power management. Its physical implementation
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contains 432,322 transistors, about equally split between PMOS and NMOS
devices.
The fadd unit contains four adders: two 32-bit units, one 64-bit unit,
and one 80-bit unit. When a 32-bit packed addition is requested, all four
units are used, and the 64-bit and 80-bit adders each take 32-bit operands
and produce a 32-bit results. When a 64-bit packed addition is requested,
the 64-bit and 80-bit adders each take 64-bit operands and produce a 64-bit
result. The fadd unit can only add one pair 80-bit operands per clock cycle.
Other combinations are possible when a memory-resident operand is added to
a register-resident, X87-style, 80-bit operand; the fadd unit also manages such
X87-mode, mixed-size addition requests.
For each addition, multiple datapaths through the addition logic oper-
ate in parallel, and for most sets of operands only one such path is expected to
compute the correct result. The relevant path for a particular pair of operands
is determined by characteristics such as the operand types (NaN, zero, denor-
mal, etc.) and their sign and exponent bits, and the result from the correct
path is selected by a multiplexor as the result of the addition.
5.3 Floating-point Addition Verification Process
To show that the floating-point addition instructions are correct, we
must prove that the AIG pair giving the four-valued formula for each data
output represents a Boolean value under any assignment of the input variables,
and that these values match our specification for floating-point addition. Our
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floating-point addition specification is an ACL2 function that operates on two
integers representing the bit-vector encoding of floating-point operands a and
b, a third integer representing the SSE MXCSR or x87 FPCW register that
specifies the rounding mode and exception masks, and two flags apre and
bpre, determining whether the operands are to be considered register-format
float values or values of a different “prenormalized” form that is used internally
during certain operations. The specification function produces integer outputs
representing res , the resulting sum of the operands, the new settings for the
exception flags, and certain implementation-specific flags about the operation.
We attempt to ensure that our specifications are themselves correct.
The specification functions are executable and may be tested against existing
floating-point implementations. We have run millions of tests of our floating-
point addition specification against Intel hardware implementations. Our spec-
ifications are also much more compact than the hardware implementations;
for example, our SSE floating-point addition specification is about 525 lines
of ACL2 code, which may be reviewed much more easily than the 33,000 lines
of Verilog composing the FADD unit. For better symbolic execution perfor-
mance, our floating-point addition specification is written at a level primarily
involving bitwise operations on integers. However, our specification has also
been proven to match an even higher-level, rational number-based function
that carefully implements the IEEE floating point specification without opti-
mization [54].
We use our GL tools to prove by symbolic execution that the evalua-
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tion of the AIGs yields the same result as the ACL2 floating-point addition
specification. This proof makes use of case-splitting based on the difference
in the exponents of the two operands. Similar case-splitting schemes have
been used in other floating-point addition verifications [5, 25]. Without such
case-splitting, the mantissas of the two operands are shifted a variable amount
relative to each other and then added together, and the BDD representation of
such a function is exponential in size. In addition to the exponent difference,
we consider whether the signs of the operands are the same (effective addi-
tion) or opposite (effective subtraction), and whether each of the operands is
a normalized floating-point number or a special kind, either denormal, zero,
infinite, indefinite, or signaling or quiet not-a-number (SNaN/QNaN). The
cases we examine are outlined in Table 5.1. For the main cases of normal and
prenormalized floats and zeros, we separately consider each exponent differ-
ence from -70 to 70 for double- and extended-precision addition and from -30
to 30 for single-precision, with signs opposite or equal also considered sepa-
rately for each difference. Since an absolute exponent difference greater than
70 (30) is beyond the point where the mantissas no longer overlap during the
addition, we consider all exponent differences greater than 70 (30) and less
than -70 (-30) each as a block.
To implement this case splitting scheme, we define a function called
Operand-Case-Okp(a, b, case) that recognizes whether a pair of operands
is appropriate for a particular subcase. This function takes the operand pair
a, b and case, a list of parameters that describe the subcase of interest. This
123














































Table 5.1: Subcases for Floating-point Addition
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parameter list includes the exponent difference, a flag indicating whether that
exponent difference must be exact or whether any absolute difference greater
than or equal to that difference is acceptable, a flag indicating whether the
signs must be equal or opposite, and lists indicating the acceptable types of
each operand. We supply Operand-Case-Okp as the case hypothesis (see
Section 3.3) and provide a list of settings of the parameter list for each of the
cases listed in Table 5.1. The GL clause processor then checks that this list of
cases is exhaustive and splits the symbolic executions into these cases.
For symbolic execution to perform acceptably, the BDD ordering must
be selected appropriately for each case. In particular, when adding or sub-
tracting two normal numbers of a given exponent difference, we ensure that
the BDD indices of the mantissa bits of the operands are arranged so that
after shifting by the appropriate exponent difference, they will be interleaved
to make the symbolic addition fast. Because we split into hundreds of cases for
each addition instruction, we generate this list programmatically: we define
a function that produces the appropriate shape specifiers (Section 3.1) when
given case, the parameter list describing the subcase.
5.4 Results
Our verification efforts began after the relevant instructions had been
thoroughly checked using a testing-based methodology. Even so, we discovered
two bugs. The first bug was a timing anomaly affecting SSE addition instruc-
tions, which we found during our initial investigation of the media unit. Later,
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a bug in the extended precision instruction was detected by symbolic simula-
tion. This bug affected a total of four pairs of input operands out of the 2160
possible, producing a denormal result of twice the correct magnitude. Because
of the small number of affected inputs, it is unlikely that random testing would
have encountered the bug; directed testing had also not detected it. Both bugs
have now been fixed.
Our proofs are collected in a regression suite that runs some proofs
nightly and other, more expensive ones weekly. The instructions verified
in these regressions include floating-point additions, comparisons, min/max
functions, format conversions, logical operations, shuffles, and integer and
floating-point multiplications. Our proofs range in speed from a few seconds
(logical operations, comparisons) to several hours (multiplications). Single-
precision floating-point addition takes 8 minutes, double-precision 40 minutes,
and extended-precision 70 minutes.
Since these proofs were originally completed, there have been several
design changes in the fadd unit. Usually, these changes do not break our
proof scripts; in a few cases, input or output signals have been renamed and
this requires simple changes in the scripts. In rare cases, the interface for
certain instructions has significantly changed so that the specification for that
instruction must be updated. So far, however, we have not needed to change
our proof strategy or to prove additional lemmas in order to fix our verification
scripts in response to a design change. Altogether, our verifications seem to




Several verification systems use symbolic execution as a core reasoning
procedure in hardware and software verification. In this chapter, we outline
the origins of symbolic execution in the software verification domain and its
use in theorem proving as a replacement for verification condition genera-
tion. We also describe the use of symbolic simulation in hardware verification,
particularly the development of symbolic trajectory evaluation for datapath
verification. Because our work integrates a symbolic execution engine into
a theorem proving framework, we also discuss the integration of automated
verification routines into theorem provers.
6.1 Symbolic Execution in Software Verification
The first symbolic execution software was intended for program ver-
ification. The EFFIGY and SELECT systems were developed at IBM and
Stanford Research Institute, respectively [10, 52, 53]. Both used symbolic ex-
pressions described at a level similar to the program code, with named variables
standing for unconstrained inputs, and used a theorem prover to algebraically
simplify these expressions. Both systems also tracked path conditions accu-
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mulated from IF tests along each execution path in order to prune the set
of possible execution paths, similar to our use of BDD path conditions for
the same purpose (Section 2.2). The reductions used in these systems were
necessarily incomplete, although SELECT implemented a complete decision
procedure for systems of linear inequalities. Because of this incompleteness,
loop structures in the targeted programs could cause the symbolic executions
to fail to terminate even when the number of iterations was bounded; these
systems therefore allowed the user to set an iteration limit.
More recently, Matthews et al. [58] used symbolic execution driven by
a theorem proving engine as the basis of a software verification tool. The
user provides a machine-code program annotated with assertions at cutpoints.
The tool symbolically executes the program from each cutpoint, stopping when
another cutpoint is reached, and attempts to prove that the assertion at the
initial cutpoint implies the assertion at the next cutpoint reached during exe-
cution. This system avoids termination checking for looping control structures
because the user is required to provide enough cutpoints to break each loop.
This methodology is independent of the symbolic execution technology used;
it only requires some way of symbolically executing non-looping programs.
A possible area of future work is to apply this methodology to our symbolic
execution platform and explore its suitability as a software verification tool.
GL uses a bit-based rather than term-based representation for sym-
bolic objects, so our symbolic execution engine is more often able to decide
control questions that arise during symbolic execution, such as whether there
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is a possible execution path along a conditional branch and whether a loop has
completed. In term-based engines, these questions are undecidable in general,
whereas in our tool, they can be answered by a Boolean satisfiability check.
However, our bit-based representation requires the range of the inputs to the
symbolic execution to be restricted to a finite set. Because of this, our system
is appropriate for a different class of problems than term-based symbolic exe-
cution engines. When a term-based symbolic execution engine is instrumented
with a powerful enough set of rules for simplifying terms in a particular do-
main, it may be able to solve problems that cannot be approached by our
Boolean reasoning-based engine. Our engine, on the other hand, is fully auto-
matic without the addition of domain-specific rules if the inputs are restricted
to a finite set.
6.2 Symbolic Simulation in Hardware Verification
Following the application of symbolic execution strategies to program
verification, Darringer [29] suggested applying similar strategies to hardware
verification. Bryant [20,21] proposed the use of ROBDDs as the representation
for wire values in hardware symbolic simulation. Extending this strategy from
Boolean logic to a ternary logic with X acting as an unknown value [19,22] led
to the development of symbolic trajectory evaluation, a form of model-checking
based on ternary symbolic simulation [39,73].
Symbolic trajectory evaluation (STE) is a model-checking procedure for
a simple linear temporal logic. In its usual form, the only temporal operator
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is the next-time operator, but the STE algorithm has also been extended
to handle other temporal operators [77]. This form of model-checking has
been used at Intel as the basis for the Forte formal verification tool; among
other efforts, this tool has recently been used to formally verify the execution
cluster of the Core i7 processor [47]. Forte is an LCF-style theorem prover with
a built-in STE engine called Voss; Forte’s logic includes several STE-related
inference rules that allow STE results to be soundly composed and shifted in
time [3, 38,59,74].
Both our work and Intel’s integrate a bit-level symbolic reasoning proce-
dure into a theorem-proving framework. However, Forte is narrowly targeted
to work with hardware designs whereas GL handles the complete general-
purpose logic of ACL2. We also have built our symbolic execution engine in
a verified manner so that a proof using our tool has the same level of trust as
the ACL2 base system with the Hons extension, whereas Voss must be trusted
in order to believe Forte’s verification results. Through the process of prov-
ing GL’s correctness, we found several bugs in our implementation that might
have gone undetected if we had integrated it as an unverified tool.
Our approach to integrating symbolic execution into a theorem prov-
ing framework also differs from Intel’s. We began with a full-fledged, general-
purpose theorem prover and designed a symbolic execution engine for its logic.
Intel began with the Voss STE engine, a symbolic simulation tool geared specif-
ically toward hardware, and built a lightweight theorem prover around it,
with the specific purpose of driving STE. As a result, our symbolic execu-
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tion engine is applicable to a variety of non-hardware-related tasks. However,
Intel’s close integration of its theorem prover with its STE engine makes in-
teraction with hardware models relatively user-friendly, e.g., “wiggling” and
concrete simulations as well as symbolic simulations and STE-based proofs
are all available through high-level commands [4, 74]. The integration of our
symbolic execution engine with E hardware models (Chapter 4) requires more
user direction to obtain theorems about the hardware model via symbolic sim-
ulation: the hardware’s E representation is symbolically simulated in AIG
mode, and the resulting AIGs are the verification targets. Composing proofs
is labor-intensive; we lack an automated way to decompose hardware modules,
prove lemmas about the pieces, then compose these proofs into one about the
top-level module. As one area of future research, we intend to address these
practical impediments by more tightly integrating our symbolic execution en-
gine with our hardware modeling infrastructure, and by providing a framework
in which hardware-related proofs may be spatially decomposed without much
additional user effort.
Besides variations of symbolic trajectory evaluation, other forms of
hardware verification range from traditional theorem proving approaches (re-
quiring extensive user interaction) to fully-automatic model- and equivalence-
checking based approaches. AMD has performed several verifications using
traditional interactive theorem proving in ACL2, including floating-point addi-
tion, multiplication, and division hardware as well as microcode for the square
root operation [67–69]. On the other hand, IBM uses a fully-automated ap-
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proach for sequential equivalence and model checking using the SixthSense
tool [6]. In addition to property and equivalence-checking, this tool has also
been used for functional correctness verification; for example, it has been used
to verify a floating-point fused multiply-add unit [45]. SixthSense has also
been used as an external proof tool within ACL2 [71]. While equivalence-
and model-checking based approaches offer an impressive degree of automa-
tion, we believe our approach offers more opportunity for manual composition
of proofs, so that they might scale beyond the capacity of fully automated
methods. We hope in future work to extend GL to take advantage of highly
automated external tools.
6.3 Automatic Proof Routines in Theorem Provers
In interactive theorem proving, the most time-consuming portion of a
verification task is usually the user interaction. A major thrust of theorem
proving research is to integrate special-purpose routines that offer greater au-
tomation for certain kinds of problems, so the user can concentrate on higher-
level problems. The goal is to allow the user to provide a high-level set of
instructions, and let the automated routines fill in the details of the proof.
Our work on GL is a step toward this same goal.
Many theorem provers include some built-in decision procedures that
are useful in a wide variety of reasoning domains. For example, ACL2 and PVS
both include decision procedures for equality-based reasoning and linear arith-
metic [16,28,41,62]. However, in many cases more domain-specific automatic
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procedures are useful. As one example, we have discussed Intel’s integration
of the Voss symbolic trajectory evaluation engine in the Forte theorem prover.
As another example, PVS contains a BDD-based symbolic model checker for
the finite µ-calculus [75]. Many theorem provers allow the user to add new
reasoning procedures.
The integration of user-defined reasoning methods into existing theorem
provers takes many forms. In some cases, the extensions are designed so that
the theorem prover with the new procedure still maintains the soundness of
the unextended prover. Harrison [37] categorizes systems allowing such exten-
sions as either fully expansive or reflective. Fully expansive extension systems
include LCF-style provers such as HOL; in such systems, the new reasoning
procedures must ultimately yield a proof described in terms of basic inference
rules in the prover’s logic. Reflective systems provide a metareasoning system
by which the user-defined reasoning procedure may be proven to be sound.
ACL2 implements a reflective extension system; it allows the user to define
meta rules and clause processors which must be proven to operate soundly
on (quoted) expressions [40, 51]. Additionally, the Milawa prover [31] uses a
reflection mechanism to prove the correctness of its own rewriting engine.
In both the fully expansive and reflective extension mechanisms, the
user is restricted in the programming language and style that may be used to
program the external reasoning procedure. In many cases, it may be preferable
to instead use an unverified external reasoning procedure. For example, it may
be advantageous to write the reasoning procedure in a different programming
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language than the one supported by the extension mechanism, particularly if
the performance of the reasoning algorithm is critical. Pre-existing verification
tools are also unlikely to be verifiable in either the fully-expansive or reflective
setting. However, some such systems may create a proof certificate checkable
in the host theorem proving system.
To integrate an unverified reasoning tool with a theorem prover, a user
may reprogram the prover’s internals; in principle, this is no more unsound
than relying on the external tool. However, ACL2 provides a mechanism
by which an unverified (“trusted”) clause processor may be installed as a
reasoning procedure [51]; this ameliorates the soundness risk of modifying
the prover itself, although there is no guarantee of the external procedure’s
soundness.
Certain unverified extensions to ACL2 are notable. Reeber and Hunt
[66] described a decidable subset of ACL2 called SULFA and provided a SAT-
based decision procedure for that subset. This extension appeals to an external
SAT-solver and thus could not be verified completely within ACL2’s metathe-
ory; it is implemented as a trusted clause processor. Sawada and Reeber [71]
also designed an unverified procedure that calls IBM’s SixthSense formal ver-
ification tool to perform hardware-related proofs.
6.4 Our Contribution
We have contributed a reasoning procedure that is fully automated, ver-
ified, and targets the entire logic of a general-purpose theorem prover, ACL2.
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That is, any ACL2 theorem in which the free variables are restricted by hy-
potheses to a finite set may, in principle, be proven by our symbolic execution-
based proof engine. Our proof engine is fully verified in ACL2, so that a
proof completed using our procedure is as trustworthy as if it used only the
built-in routines of the theorem prover itself. We believe this distinguishes our
work from previous efforts in both the domains of interactive theorem proving
and fully automatic verification methods such as are often used in hardware
verification.
While the conjectures that may be proven by our framework may in
principle also be solved by exhaustive testing, we have successfully applied
this procedure to many problems that were beyond the capacity of exhaus-
tive testing. For example, we have verified several functions of a commercial
x86 processor design, including extended-precision floating point addition, for
which the set of possible inputs is over 2160.
The full codebase for the GL symbolic execution framework will be
available in the distributed books of future ACL2 releases [49] and from the
ACL2 books repository [2]. The GL release includes automated utilities for:
• running and examining output of symbolic executions
• proving theorems by symbolic execution, optionally with case-splitting
• defining symbolic counterparts for user-defined functions
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• defining extended symbolic interpreters which may directly call a user-
provided set of functions.
The GL codebase contains purely user-level ACL2 code, loadable using
the standard ACL2 INCLUDE-BOOK command. The codebase contains over
20,000 lines of code among 66 ACL2 event files (books). These books contain
over 700 function definitions and 1200 lemmas. This includes:
• definitions and correctness proofs of manually-generated symbolic coun-
terparts (such as for ACL2 primitives): 100 definitions, 300 lemmas;
• the GL symbolic interpreter and clause processor and their correctness
proofs: 190 definitions, 370 lemmas;
• the program transformation to automate the creation of symbolic coun-
terparts for user-defined functions: 180 definitions, 150 lemmas;
• symbolic if-then-else implementation and correctness proofs: 40 defini-
tions, 85 lemmas;
• basic definitions concerning the symbolic object format: 180 definitions,
290 lemmas.
This framework is currently in use at Centaur Technology for execution
unit verification. It has been used to verify the implementations of many





We have implemented a symbolic execution framework for ACL2 that is
integrated with the theorem prover and mechanically verified. This framework
includes a proof procedure that produces theorems with the same level of trust
as the ACL2 system with the Hons extension. This framework has become a
core tool in the hardware verification flow at Centaur Technology, a designer
of commercial x86-compatible processors.
Our symbolic execution engine operates primarily on the bit level, using
BDDs as our Boolean function representation. Our bit-level representation
allows our framework to prove many finite-domain conjectures automatically,
scaling beyond the capacity of exhaustive testing on many problems. The proof
procedure we have built around the symbolic execution engine also produces
counterexamples in cases where it fails due to a false conjecture. Because of
its automation and counterexample-generation capabilities, the need for the
user to interactively guide the prover is reduced, and the user may prove or
disprove desirable properties of the hardware or software under investigation
without first obtaining a deep understanding of the details of the design.
In order to facilitate proofs using our symbolic execution engine, we pro-
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vide a framework that automates the steps of such proofs, including coverage
proofs, while still giving the user fine-grained control over performance-critical
details such as case-splitting and BDD variable orderings. The interface to
this framework is designed so that the user never needs to directly construct
or reason about BDDs: the case split is given by an ACL2 function, and the
symbolic inputs are constructed automatically from a shape specifier. This
high-level interface also facilitates the automation of coverage proofs, which
reason about the shape specifiers so as to avoid having to reason about the
more complicated BDD-based symbolic inputs.
This framework is in use as a core formal verification tool at Centaur
Technology. We have used it to verify many instructions of the VIA NanoTM
processor, and verification work using this tool is ongoing. As we discuss in
the following sections, we intend in future work to improve our framework so
that it may be successfully applied to larger and more varied problems.
7.1 Future Work
We have many ideas for extending this work. Two possible directions
were mentioned in the previous section: building a cutpoint-based software
verification framework around our symbolic execution engine, and improving
the integration between our symbolic execution framework and our hardware
models. Another direction for future research is to allow more flexibility in the
symbolic object format and symbolic reasoning procedures of our tool, which
may increase the scalability of the system. For example, it may be helpful
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to use an alternative Boolean function representation such as AIGs rather
than BDDs as the basis of our bit-level representation (Subsection 7.1.1). For
some problems it may also be helpful to replace the bits in our representation
by ternary values such as are used in STE; in cases where certain input bits
are irrelevant to the result, this may provide up to exponential speedup by
replacing variables withX values (Subsection 7.1.2). A more extensive possible
modification to our symbolic reasoning procedures would be to integrate term-
based methods such as SMT, so that problems could be approached at a higher
level of abstraction when possible.
Another direction of future research is toward finding a wider range
of applications of our framework. As we discussed in the previous section,
our symbolic execution engine might be usefully integrated into a cutpoint-
based software verification framework. Another application is in bridging the
semantic gap between the ACL2 logic and the languages of automated methods
such as model checking (Subsection 7.1.3).
7.1.1 AIG-based symbolic execution
In our framework, each symbolic bit is expressed as a BDD. As future
work we plan to explore using AIGs as the Boolean function representation
and SAT-based reasoning. These two representations and reasoning strategies
have complementary strengths: BDDs usually outperform SAT on regular,
arithmetic-style reasoning when a good variable ordering exists, but SAT is
more scalable on less-regular problems where there may be no efficient BDD
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ordering. Because of this, we hope that allowing GL to use AIG/SAT based
reasoning will allow us to solve a large class of problems that could not be han-
dled by the BDD-based implementation alone. In recent work we have added
to GL an AIG-based operating mode, so that the user may choose between
using the AIG- and BDD-based representations for each proof; this AIG-based
mode uses an external tool based on MiniSat [34] to decide the satisfiability
of queries expressed as AIGs. Beyond this, we will consider methods by which
the two strategies might be combined so that BDDs and AIGs/SAT might
both be used within a single symbolic execution.
AIGs offer much more flexibility than BDDs in choosing how much rea-
soning to attempt at a given point in the computation. For example, when
analyzing an IF test as in Section 2.2, we obtain BDDs describing the cases
under which the test is known true, known false, and unknown. In our BDD-
based system, this allows us to immediately tell which branches must be taken.
In contrast, with an AIG representation, this question becomes a satisfiability
query, but an optional one: we might instead choose to symbolically execute
both branches. Although it is not clear when we should make this choice, it
seems many optimizations are possible. For example, we would likely wish
to perform some random simulation of the AIG in question, since this might
immediately show that the AIG took both true and false values. Various
simplification strategies may also be applied before attempting to check SAT
directly. For example, DAG-aware rewriting [60] and cut-sweeping [33] offer







Table 7.1: Four-valued logic
needs to be called. FRAIGing [61] and SAT-sweeping [55], though more ex-
pensive, achieve greater simplification by proving equivalences between AIG
nodes using SAT.
7.1.2 Ternary symbolic execution
In symbolic trajectory evaluation, the values assigned to each wire in
a hardware model are abstracted in two crucial ways. First, like the symbolic
objects used in GL, they may be functions of Boolean variables. Second, the
values taken by these functions are not simply the Boolean values 1 and 0,
but may also be the value X, sometimes called ⊥, representing an unknown
value. Because there are now three values possible for each wire, this is termed
ternary simulation [19, 23]. A fourth value, called >, is also often added; this
is an overconstrained value meaning that the wire is logically excluded from
having either 1 or 0 as its value. These four values correspond to sets of simple
Boolean values that the wire might take, described in Table 7.1. These four
values form a complete lattice partially ordered by the subset relation, and
the three-valued subset forms a semilattice.
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In this section we focus on ternary simulation, since the primary ad-
vantage of either a three- or four-valued logic over a pure Boolean logic is
the presence of the X value. Most of our comments are equally applicable to
quaternary simulation.
In symbolic simulations, ternary values are usually encoded as pairs of
bits. A particular symbolic simulation in a three-valued logic therefore requires
computing twice as many Boolean formulas as a similar two-valued symbolic
simulation. However, in practice, often either the two formulas encoding the
symbolic value of a wire are closely related or else one is much simpler than the
other. Because of this, three-valued symbolic simulations often require only a
small overhead above similar two-valued symbolic simulations.
Offsetting this overhead, X values allow abstract values to be expressed
without introducing new variables, sometimes reducing the number of Boolean
variables needed to express a conjecture. That is, a simulation in which several
inputs are set to X covers the same concrete Boolean cases as if each of those
inputs were set to an independent Boolean variable. The trade-off is that while
additional variables are expensive, simulating with X values loses precision.
In hardware verification, often many inputs to a circuit are “don’t-cares;” the
loss of precision from setting these inputs to X is not important, and doing so
prevents symbolic simulators from computing complicated formulas involving
these inputs.
In our symbolic execution framework, we could take advantage of these
savings by replacing each symbolic bit in our object representation with a
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symbolic ternary value, encoded by a pair of Boolean functions. The evaluation
of such a symbolic object would then yield a set of objects, one for each
assignment of T or NIL to each X value. In general, the size of the set is
exponential in the number of X present. However, there is no need to compute
this set explicitly in order to use a ternary representation in a proof scheme
similar to that described in Section 1.2.
The theory behind proof by symbolic execution requires modification to
accomodate the fact that ternary symbolic objects evaluate to sets rather than
single objects. Here we still write 〈s〉(e) for the evaluation of a symbolic object
s under environment e, with the understanding that this now represents a set
of values. The coverage set of a ternary symbolic object is the union over the
range of 〈s〉. A ternary symbolic execution of a function f on s then produces
a symbolic object s′ satisfying
∀e . 〈s′〉(e) ⊇ {f(x) : x ∈ 〈s〉 (e)} . (7.1)
Note that the evaluation of the result must only be a superset of the possible
concrete results; in general, computation with X values may yield overapprox-
imate results.
The definition of a symbolic counterpart for a ternary symbolic execu-
tion is the same as in Section 1.2, except that we use the definition of a ternary
symbolic execution. That is, fsym is a symbolic counterpart if it always yields
a symbolic execution of f on its argument:
∀s, e . 〈fsym (s)〉(e) ⊇ {f(x) : x ∈ 〈s〉 (e)} (7.2)
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Finally, the mechanism for proof by ternary symbolic execution is a
straightforward modification of Theorem 1.2.1:
Theorem 7.1.1 (Proof by ternary symbolic execution). Suppose:
• Some symbolic object s covers the set of inputs satisfying Hyp:
∀x . Hyp(x)⇒ ∃e . x ∈ 〈s〉(e) (7.3)
• Conclsym is a symbolic counterpart for Concl:
∀s, e . 〈Conclsym (s)〉(e) ⊇ {Concl(x) : x ∈ (〈s〉(e))} (7.4)
• Conclsym(s) yields a constant-true symbolic value:
∀e . {true} ⊇ 〈Conclsym (s)〉(e). (7.5)
Then
∀x . Hyp(x)⇒ Concl(x).
Implementation of this modification to GL is conceptually straightfor-
ward. However, ACL2 has better support for equality-based reasoning than
it does for transitive/reflexive relations such as ⊆, so completing the neces-
sary proofs may be more challenging. We expect there to also be interesting
research related to improving proof automation and the user experience.
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7.1.3 Symbolic model checking
Beyond increasing the scalability of our system, there is also possi-
ble future research in expanding its applications. To date we have used GL
in datapath-related hardware verification problems, where the properties we
sought to prove have involved finitely-constrained input spaces. However, a
large class of hardware verification problems are more naturally stated as tem-
poral logic properties of finite-state machines and proven using model check-
ing. Our framework may aid in translating machine models and properties
expressed in ACL2 into an appropriate form for model checking.
Expressing arbitrary temporal logic properties in a first-order logic such
as ACL2 is not straightforward. However, safety properties (of the form AGp
in CTL or Gp in LTL) may be expressed in terms of paths through the state
transition graph. To posit that AGp holds at initial state s is equivalent to
stating that, for all finite paths through the state transition graph beginning
at s, the final state s′ in the path satisfies p(s′). Liveness properties AFp or
Fp may be transformed into safety properties, as demonstrated by Biere et
al [8, 72].
One might wish to combine ACL2 with a model checker so that it could
act as a decision procedure for certain specially formulated theorems such as
the safety property above; such a model checker could either be built in the
ACL2 logic or installed as a trusted external tool. Suppose the finite state
machine model and the property to be checked are defined as a set of ACL2
functions:
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• MStatep(s), a predicate recognizing the (finitely many) well-formed
states of the machine
• Tr(s, s′), the FSM’s transition relation, recognizing pairs of states such
that s may transition to s′,
• p(s), a predicate recognizing states satisfying some atomic property.
A model checker must be able to determine the set of states to which a given
state may transition: either a list of next-states for an explicit-state model
checker, or for a symbolic model checker, a symbolic expression for the set
of next-states, usually expressed as a Boolean function. A transition relation
defined as an ACL2 function such as Tr does not make this explicit. However,
we may use GL to symbolically execute the transition relation on two inde-
pendent, symbolic states, computing a Boolean expression for the transition
relation. Similarly, atomic properties expressed as ACL2 functions p could
be symbolically executed on a symbolic state, yielding a Boolean expression
for that property. Thus an FSM model expressed at a high level in the ACL2
logic could be connected in a verifiable manner with one expressed in a Boolean
language suitable for input to a symbolic model checker.
Integration of model checkers with theorem provers is not new: model
checkers have been integrated into PVS [64, 70, 75] and HOL [46]; however,
defining the semantics of LTL and CTL inside ACL2 is not straightforward
due to its first-order logic. For example, the meaning of AFp(s) is “for every
(infinite-length) path in the state transition graph beginning at s, there is
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some i such that the ith state in the path satisfies p.” This cannot be stated
directly in ACL2 since paths of infinite length are not representable. A subtly
different statement “there is some i such that all paths of length i beginning at
s contain a state satisfying p” is equivalent in the finite-state case [8], since if
there is a counterexample of length equal to the total number of states, there
is a lasso-shaped (eventually periodic) counterexample path of infinite length.
Ray et al defined a semantics for LTL in ACL2 [65] using this insight.
7.1.4 Generalizing the Approach
ACL2 has several features that have been very advantageous in imple-
menting the GL framework: its logic is connected with a fast execution engine,
and its terms may be represented and manipulated for metareasoning purposes
within its logic. Furthermore, the hash-consing and memoization capabilities
of the Hons extension yield a reasonably efficient BDD package. It is question-
able whether a symbolic execution tool similar to GL could be feasibly built
in another theorem proving system without first adding similar capabilities.
Some other theorem provers, such as Isabelle/HOL [7] and Coq [35] have a
mechanism by which the result of a ground term’s execution may be inferred
to be equal to the term. Reflective decision procedures have also been defined
and verified in these two systems, demonstrating that their execution mecha-
nisms can be useful for metareasoning [9,24]. Additionally, Milawa [31] is quite
similar to ACL2 in its support for execution and meta-reasoning capabilities.
ACL2’s logic is also dynamically typed, which appears advantageous
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for the kind of reflective reasoning needed in a framework such as GL. For a
statically typed logic, several difficulties would require approaches that differ
from ours. For example, in our approach a symbolic object evaluator is capa-
ble of producing concrete objects of many different types, and we may bind
variables to objects of many different types in an evaluation environment.
The GL framework uses a reasoning strategy based on BDDs, and we
have discussed future modifications based on changing the bit representation.
However, the general strategy we used in creating a verified symbolic execution
engine would be equally applicable to other symbolic data representations and
reasoning procedures. To create a verified symbolic execution engine, one de-
fines (1) a symbolic object language with an evaluation semantics, (2) for each
primitive function of the logic, a function that is provably a symbolic counter-
part, and (3) a method of tracking path conditions and deciding control-flow
tests. While alternative symbolic data formats and reasoning methods may
present different challenges in verifying such a framework, our work demon-
strates the feasibility of this approach.
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